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Unmanned, aerial vehicles (UAVs) are an increasingly important element 
of many modern militaries. Their success on battlefields in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
around the globe has driven demand for a variety of types of unmanned vehicles. 
Their proven value consists in low risk and low cost, and their capabilities include 
persistent surveillance, tactical and combat reconnaissance, resilience, and 
dynamic re-tasking.  
This research evaluates past, current, and possible future operating 
environments for several UAV platforms to survey the changing dynamics of 
combat-aviation tactics and make recommendations regarding UAV employment 
scenarios to the Turkish military. 
While UAVs have already established their importance in military operations, 
ongoing evaluations of UAV operating environments, capabilities, technologies, 
concepts, and organizational issues inform the development of future systems. 
To what extent will UAV capabilities increasingly define tomorrow’s missions, 
requirements, and results in surveillance and combat tactics? 
Integrating UAVs and concepts of operations (CONOPS) on future 
battlefields is an emergent science. Managing a transition from manned- to 
unmanned and remotely piloted aviation platforms involves new technological 
complexity and new aviation personnel roles, especially for combat pilots. 
Managing a UAV military transformation involves cultural change, which can be 
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Network-centric warfare (NCW) is defined as an information-superiority-
enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power. The 
NCW objective is to achieve shared awareness, synchronized forces, increased 
speed of command, faster tempo of operations, greater lethality, greater 
survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization by networking sensors, 
decision makers, and shooters. In essence, NCW translates information 
superiority into combat power by effectively linking geographically or 
hierarchically dispersed entities in the battlespace [1]. Having a better, near-real-
time picture of what is happening in the battlespace reduces the level of 
uncertainty—the gap between what a commander needs to know and does 
know—in a meaningful way. Furthermore, NCW has the potential to contribute to 
the merging of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. 
Network-centric warfare recognizes the potential for decoupling sensors 
from specific actors and separating both sensors and actors from platforms in a 
geographically dispersed force. It also recognizes the centrality of information by 
specifying knowledgeable assets in a dynamic environment. Recent military 
operations analyzed in Chapter III have highlighted the power of new types of 
relationships among sensors, deciders, and actors that is now possible with 
network-centric force enhancements. In these operations, the sensor was 
operated by actors at a single location. The information collected by the sensor 
was analyzed by decision makers at multiple dispersed locations and at various 
levels of command; mission-critical information was then transmitted in near-real 
time to decision makers on disparate command and control platforms and thence 
to area-of-responsibility (AOR) shooters, who engaged the targets the UAVs had 
sensed [1]. 
In the present NCW-enabled, command-and-control shift, sensor networks 
emerge as key enablers of increased combat power, serving as a unified 
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framework for both decision-making procedures and situational awareness. The 
operational value or benefit of sensor networks is derived from their ability to 
generate more complete, accurate, and timely information than can be generated 
by sensors standing alone [1].  
The networking of sensors that can perform numerous missions such as 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in near real time provides the 
basis for developing and leveraging information superiority for battlespace 
awareness. Network superiority can directly affect the pace of operations.  
For instance, the time from target acquisition to release of weapons 
(i.e., the sensor-to-shooter gap) has been reduced from days or 
hours in the Gulf War of 1991 to hours or minutes in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. As one example, in Afghanistan a Predator UAV 
communicated reconnaissance data directly to an AC-130, not only 
obviating the need for time-consuming data transfers (and 
Combined Air Operations Center analysis-and-evaluation delays), 
but also allowing the AC-130 to fire during first overflight without a 
reconnaissance flyby [2]. 
UAVs as sensors in the NCW concept have great potential to transform 
the battlespace information by providing tactical responsiveness and extending 
the sight and reach of military power. For example, the global command-and-
control system (GCCS) is a comprehensive, worldwide network (classified and 
unclassified) that provides the National Command Authority, joint staff, 
combatant and functional unified commands, services, defense agencies, joint 
task forces, and their service components with information processing and 
dissemination capabilities required for the command and control (C2) of 
dispersed forces. The primary objective of GCCS is to implement an architecture 
consisting of C2 forces and elements within a highly flexible and adaptive system. 
In support of operations, the GCCS must be able to collect, process, 
disseminate, support and protect information to gain information and decision 
superiority. It supports the National Command Authority and subordinate 
elements in the generation and application of national power [3].  
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GCCS provides the warrior a fused, real-time, true picture of the 
battlespace and the ability to order, respond, and coordinate 
horizontally and vertically to the degree necessary to successfully 
prosecute the warfighting mission in that battlespace [4]. 
GCCS creates a broadly connected, joint system of joint systems that 
provides total battlespace information, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   GCCS Interfaces (From: Joint Interoperability Test Command 
(JITC) Web Page) http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil  
As one of the GCCS interfaces, a UAV GCS (unmanned, aerial vehicle; 
ground-control station) appears to have an important role in networked sensors. 
The objective is to produce a uniform, accessible, situational-awareness picture 
in which information from the various domains works together in useful forms. 
With the UAV GCS interface, commanders control a Predator UAV GCS by 
means of electro-optical-infrared surveillance and an ultra-high-frequency, voice-
relay package to improve the warfighter’s operational capabilities and battlefield 
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situational awareness (SA). The unmanned aircraft can instantaneously transmit 
payload imagery, aircraft position, and target data to the command center in real 
time to enable the center to record and rebroadcast the information via network 
and satellite to commands around the world. A global-command-and-control 
system, joint, integrated, intelligence-and-imagery (GCCS-J I3) suite can process 
and display video made available to commands via tape, the Secret Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), wide- and local-area networks, and satellite. 
A video-ingestor workstation collects the data and provides it to all I3 nodes in 
the network. The workstation can also be used as an imagery client that requires 
a special MPEG encoder card; currently one per input source or channel is used. 
GCCS-J I3 utilizes the video-ingestor and text grabber to decipher telemetry 
received by network/broadcast from the UAV ground-control station [5].  
Advanced technology, improved sensors, new collection platforms such as 
satellites, UAVs etc., and improved concepts enabled by greater computing 
power have combined to increase battlespace awareness and reduce uncertainty 
for information superiority. Network-centric concepts are also enhancing current 
force applications and enabling new warfighting capabilities in the battlefield. 
During Operation Allied Force, the Kosovo air operation, U.S. and 
coalition aircrews flew more than 36,000 sorties in support of a 
wide range of missions. The UAVs were employed as stand alone 
platforms and in conjunction with a wide range of other ISR 
(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets, including 
assets such as Joint Surveillance and Joint Target Attack Radar 
System (JSTARS), RIVET JOINT, Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS), U-2, and other coalition and service sensors [6]. 
By the SA gained by NCW, a commander on the battlefield may have 
more current and accurate information. This concept is very important in today’s 
information-rich operating environment, and even more important than in the 
past. Warfighters can benefit from information traditionally held by higher-level 
commanders and from direct feeds from platforms such as UAVs [6]. The idea of 
having the right information at the right time can be a significant force multiplier 
for militaries. 
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Networking amounts to getting the right information, faster, to the right 
forces, who in turn can take the right action faster, as the basis for accomplishing 
the military objective in a dynamic and complex battlefield. It can shorten what is 
often called the ”kill chain,” i.e., the process of detecting, deciding, attacking, and 
assessing. It also reduces the resources required to move through each link in 
command and control. Information gathering and sharing are the essence of 
network-centric, warfare-getting data for those who need it, when they need it. A 
key method for gathering that data is the use of UAVs. A network-centric fighting 
force relies heavily on data provided by UAV sensors. Therefore, this study 
analyzes and draws conclusions about UAV impacts on NCW and military 
transformation. 
The remainder of this study examines several major UAV platforms in 
terms of their roles and capabilities in past and current operating environments. 
The questions examined in this thesis are as follows: 
1. Based on four recent combined-force conflicts (two Iraqi conflicts, and 
one each in Bosnia and Afghanistan), how has introduction and increasing use of 
UAVs affected U.S. aviation-combat tactics? 
2. How have UAVs expanded into different aviation mission areas under 
the U.S.’s NCW framework? 
3. What performance indicators are used to assess UAVs? 
4. What are the future direction and primary challenges facing the 
planning and integration of UAV platform and tactics? 
Chapter II discusses the background of UAVs, including the Hunter, 
Pioneer, Predator and Global Hawk. Chapter III looks at past and current 
operating environments for UAVs. Chapter IV gives an analysis of each UAV and 
its mission, as well as UAV utilities, limitations, and performance metrics as 
observed during tests and operations. In Chapter V, the future direction of UAVs 
is examined; this section is based on DoD Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 
Roadmap 2005-2030. Chapter VI looks at the Turkish armed forces’ utilities in 
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regard to current UAV types and needs. Chapter VII includes conclusions and 
recommendations to Turkish forces based on mission, UAV, and NCW analysis. 






II. BACKGROUND OF UAVS 
A. EMPLOYMENT OF UAVS 
This chapter defines unmanned, aerial vehicles (UAVs) and describes the 
reasons and the changes that lead to the employment of particular UAVs in four 
conflicts (Gulf War I, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Gulf War II) while looking at the 
UAVs employed during these conflicts. Political and economic considerations are 
offered, including relevant technological advancements. UAV impacts on these 
four conflicts are examined in the next chapter. 
Since the beginning of unmanned aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles have 
been called by many different names (pilotless aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles 
(RPVs), drones, etc.) These assets are defined by the DoD as: 
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, 
uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly 
autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or 
semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are 
not typically considered UAVs [7]. 
Commanders and soldiers have wanted to see what is behind the next hill 
since the first battle. The ability to see distant battlefields anytime by UAV sensor 
is a major battlespace advantage. Tactical commanders with UAVs at their 
disposal can obtain intelligence preparation needed for potential problem areas. 
This organic capability can reduce dependence on manned aircraft, including in 
some cases the ability to deliver weapons without pilot endangerment. 
UAVs are becoming an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) platform of choice, allowing observation of the enemy by more efficient 
means and increasing SA through real-time intelligence. Since Gulf War I, UAVs 
have undergone rapid growth in capability and numbers and will continue to 
proliferate as the U.S. military finds new ways to employ them.  
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With such capabilities, force-enhancing options for UAVs are easy to 
imagine. In addition to these options, there are other factors behind the recent 
push in UAV development. The advances that have boosted the perceived 
military value of UAVs are outlined in [8] as: 
• Improved command, control, and communications, image 
processing, and image-exploitation capabilities [8] 
o Dramatic increases in computer-processing power and 
associated software advances [8] 
o Advanced sensor technologies that make possible high-
resolution collection with much-reduced sensor size and 
weight [8] 
• Increased recognition by UAV advocates in industry and 
government that aerospace-quality expertise is essential because a 
model-airplane, hobby-shop approach to development will not yield 
reliable and militarily useful unmanned air systems capable of 
supporting demanding missions [8] 
o Advances in efficiency and reductions in size and weight of 
propulsion systems [8] 
o The availability of robust, long-endurance UAV platforms 
resulting from visionary investments by the Defense Advanced 












The maturation of UAV key developments is illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Technology Past Present Future 
Affordability Marginal Design to Cost 
Implemented 
Low Lifecycle Cost Realized
Data Links Analog/Low Bandwidth Digital, High Cost for 
Bandwidth 
Standardized for USAF 
Architecture, Modular, 
Engines Whatever Available Off-the-Shelf 
Commercial 
Designed for UAVs, 
More Fuel Efficient 
Human Systems Automate What Was 
Technically Feasible; 
Human Filled the Gaps 
Inconsistent Function 
Allocation; Minimum 
Attention to Human 
Factors
Simulation-based 
Design for Systems 
Relevant to Human 






Mission Planning Little Automation Some Automation, 
Slow, Inflexible 
Automated, Flexible, 
Fast, Utilizing Parallel 




Producibility Not Emphasized Major Advances, Low 
Cost Tools for 
Composites
Designed for Low Rate, 
Low Cost Production 
Sensors Heavy, Bulky, Marginal 
Reliability 










System Reliability Marginal Better, but not 
Acceptable 
Robust Systems, 
Very Low Failure 
Training Reliance on Prior 




Crew Selected and Trained 










Optimized for UAVs: 
Performance, Weight, 
Cost, Automation 
Vehicle Structure Manned A/C Metal 
Approach, Large Parts 
Counts 
Composites Not Fully 
Exploited, Reduced Part 
Count
Tailored Composite 
Structure, Very Low Part 
Count, High Fuel Fraction
Weapons None Little Consideration Small, Modular, 
Integrated System 
Table 1.   Technologies for UAVs (From: Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval 
Operations) 
In each key technology, significant advances have been made. For 
example, vehicle structures have moved to lightweight, special-composite 
materials; data-link designs have responded to high-capacity demands offering 
substantial throughput; sensor designs have significantly improved performance 
while reducing weight; engines, endurance, and manufacturing have adopted 
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proven aerospace designs; and some automation has been accomplished in 
mission planning, enabling more time for the mission itself. Also, the results of 
significant advances in propulsion and aerodynamics have increased the range, 
persistence, and altitude capabilities of UAVs, providing much greater endurance 
than manned aircraft. 
In addition to these technological advancements and changes, critical 
world events mentioned in [9] have encouraged the use of UAVs to perform 
missions without personnel risk and with lower operational costs than 
comparable manned systems. The details of four of these engagements are 
provided in Chapter III. Consider the following world events that highlight some of 
the military and strategic utility of UAVs: 
• The collapse of the Soviet Union mitigated the requirement for 
billions of dollars spent on strategic intelligence systems and 
community infrastructure. The “new world order” that arose was 
less predictable, nontraditional, and unsuitable for appraisal by our 
strategic intelligence system. The requirement for intense 
monitoring of Soviet ballistic-missile submarines, intercontinental, 
ballistic-missile (ICBM) testing, aircraft development, and the status 
of Warsaw Pact ground forces was vastly reduced [9].  
• Shrinking defense budgets post-1989 appeared to be just another 
fact of life. The hordes of intelligence analysts, the “stove piped” 
architectures and disciplines, and classification “green doors” 
guarding critical intelligence data were also rapidly disappearing. 
The U.S. military was striving to find cheaper solutions to military 
needs, including providing more mission flexibility to handle 
emerging dynamic, unpredictable, and unfamiliar situations [9].  
• Another catalyst for change was Desert Storm, not from its military 
success, but from its intelligence failures. Many military experts 
involved at the operational and tactical levels during that conflict 
assert that the intelligence system broke down and did not support 
the tactical commander. In fact the intelligence system did exactly 
what it was designed to do, which was to support the national 
command authority and the CINC at the strategic and operational 
levels of war. Desert Storm, from an intelligence standpoint, was an 
unforeseen type of war. What seemed “broken” was a lack of 
forethought in fielding intelligence-support systems for warriors at 
the forefront of conflicts. Another outcome, probably with more 
consequence to the future of armed conflict than highlighting 
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intelligence-system failures, was the paucity of U.S. casualties 
during the war. Apparently, U.S. and other western nations have 
become extremely sensitive to conflict-inflicted human suffering [9]. 
An additional good reason for the increased demand in UAV development 
is the growing need for real-time intelligence. As one UAV expert stated: 
The reason for this increase in interest and market size is fairly 
simple: the use of the "vertical dimension" to gather or relay 
information is becoming vital to successful operations in the post-
Cold War era. Moreover, UAVs may start to replace manned 
aircraft for the transportation and delivery of goods and services 
under benign, or routine, conditions.... Unmanned aircraft may 
perform as effectively as and more cheaply than either satellites or 
manned aircraft. Thus, UAVs complete the array of capability 
necessary to fully populate this vertical dimension of the rapidly 
growing information world [10]. 
The essential intelligence principle that the one who can see all and use 
the intelligence in near-real time dominates in the battlespace is the main reason 
for the demand for immediate and real-time intelligence. Sun Tzu’s dictated the 
importance of intelligence as follows: “Know your enemy and know yourself and 
you can fight a hundred battles without disaster [10].” 
The emphasis on systems’ providing total battlefield intelligence is 
common sense as long as the information reaches the end user in acceptable 
format and when needed. After the Gulf War, there were many stories of 
available national intelligence not reaching users [10]. The employment of UAVs 
can enable commanders to adapt to collection methods and receive the 
intelligence they need in near-real time. 
A few additional reasons for the rapid development of UAV roles and 
missions include lower development and operational costs and reduced losses in 
both the vehicle itself and personnel. As one military analyst stated about UAVs 
and their inherent low-risk and high-payoff intelligence returns, “Since UAVs are 
designed to penetrate and loiter in threat environments deemed too risky for 
manned aircraft, they are naturals for the cat-and-mouse contests between 
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electronic-warfare (EW) systems and air defense and other threat emitters [10].” 
To the extent that defense forces are threatened by decreasing budgets, cost- 
and pilot-saving platforms become more attractive. The fact that UAVs are 
cheaper to develop, maintain, and operate than manned aircraft makes them 
extremely attractive to the services especially when faced with increased 
“operations other than war” (OOTW) requirements. 
Another reason for the recent interest in UAV development is the fact that 
the operations tempos faced by the services has increased. This rise in 
operational deployments is primarily derived from supporting global OOTW, 
placing additional strain on the national military strategy, which cites numerous 
roles and missions for the services and appears to contribute directly to a faster 
operations tempo [10]. One defense analyst indicated the magnitude of the 
increase in operations tempo by stating “since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
operations tempo has increased by over three-hundred percent [10].”    
Another factor encouraging UAVs’ takeover of manned-aircraft 
roles is the public’s aversion to casualties in OOTW. As the United 
States increases its participation in OOTW, the nation’s focus on 
justified casualties heightens the importance of force protection. 
The necessity to minimize casualties builds a strong case for 
increased UAV usage and force protection. This emphasis on force 
protection is often highlighted by media coverage depicting forces 
executing OOTW. This attention is especially acute when 
casualties are broadcast on national television. Military and political 
leaders are well aware of the power of the media [10]. 
As Napoleon once said, “Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared 
than a thousand bayonets [10].” 
B. DESCRIPTION OF UAVS EMPLOYED IN RECENT CONFLICTS  
The following material highlights four UAV systems (RQ-2B Pioneer, RQ-5 
Hunter, MQ-1B Predator and RQ-4 Global Hawk) used in recent combat 
situations. Most of the following information in Section B was derived from [11]. 
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1. RQ-2B Pioneer 
a. Features 
The Pioneer is a both a shipborne and land-based, tactical, close-
range UAV that can perform a wide variety of missions such as reconnaissance, 
surveillance, target acquisition and battle-damage assessment and provide the 
commander with real-time imagery of the battlespace. It has a great degree of 
cover as a result of its low radar cross section, reduced silhouette, low infrared 
signature, and remote-control versatility. 
b. Background 
The RQ-2B Pioneer has been in the service of the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Army since 1986. It was first developed for employment in gunnery 
spotting on battleships and evolved to perform ISR missions for amphibious 
forces. Launched by rocket assist, pneumatic launcher, or from a runway, it 
recovers on a runway with arresting gear after flying up to five hours with a 
seventy-five-pound payload [11]. It uses a C-band, line-of-sight (LOS) data link to 
relay analog video in real time. The Pioneer has performed ISR missions since 
the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and is still supporting Marine forces in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Navy transferred Pioneer to the Marine Corps in 2002, 
ending its operations. The Marine Corps is preserving the Pioneer until a 




    
Figure 2.   The RQ-2B Pioneer 
2. RQ-5A/MQ-5B Hunter 
a. Features 
The Hunter is a joint-tactical UAV that is capable of performing ISR, 
battle-damage-assessment, target-acquisition, and battlefield-observation 
missions. 
The primary payload on the RQ-5A is the multipurpose optical 
stabilized payload (MOSP), which includes television and forward-looking 
infrared (FLIR) to provide day and night surveillance [12]. Also, some Hunters are 
equipped with new sensors such as a third-generation FLIR and a spotter for the 
daytime TV camera. The other advanced mission payloads that the Hunter can 
carry include a laser designator, electronics-countermeasure payloads (i.e., a 
communications warning receiver, communications jammer, and radar jammer), 
a communications-relay payload that extends VHF/UHF communications beyond 
line of sight [12]. The Hunter can operate in relay with two air vehicles airborne 
simultaneously over a C-band, LOS data link. 
b. Background 
The RQ-5A Hunter was originally a joint Army-Navy-Marine Corps 
short-range UAV that the Army intended for division- and corps-level 
requirements [11]. The program was initiated in 1989 and the first Hunter entered 
the service in 1996. It was deployed to Macedonia to support NATO Balkan 
operations in 1999 and to Iraq in 2002 [11]. The MQ-5B’s first flight was in 2005 
  15
and is still fielded by the U.S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. MQ-5B Hunter 
dropped a laser-guided bomb on a target in Iraq in September 2007 [12]. It is 




    
Figure 3.   The RQ-5A/MQ-5B Hunter 
3. MQ-1B Predator  
a. Features 
The MQ-1B Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV 
which is employed as a theater asset for ISR and target acquisition in support of 
joint-force commander, even though it is a hunter-killer for critical, time-sensitive 
targets. 
A fully operational Predator system consists of four aircraft, a 
ground-control station, a primary satellite link, and approximately fifty-five 
personnel for deployed round-the-clock operations [13]. The aircraft can be 
dismantled and the ground-control system can be transported in a C-130 
transport aircraft. 
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The basic crew for the Predator is one pilot and two sensor 
operators who fly the aircraft via a line-of-sight data link, or a 
satellite data link for beyond line-of-sight flight. The aircraft is 
equipped with a color nose camera, a variable-aperture daytime TV 
camera, a variable-aperture infrared camera for low light and 
nighttime missions, and a synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) to look 
through smoke, clouds and haze. The cameras produce motion 
video while the SAR produces still-frame radar images [13]. 
The MQ-1 Predator can employ two laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire 
antitank missiles with the multispectral targeting system (MTS).  
b. Background 
The Air Force MQ-1 Predator was one of the initial advanced-
concept technology demonstrations (ACTD) in 1994 and transitioned to an Air 
Force program in 1997 [13]. It has flown ISR missions in four recent conflicts 
since 1995. It was re-designated from RQ-1 to MQ-1 after gaining the ability to 
employ Hellfire antitank missiles in 2001. The Air Force employs twelve Predator 
systems stationed in three squadrons.  
 
 
    




4. RQ-4 Global Hawk 
a. Features 
RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high altitude, long-endurance UAV capable 
of precise targeting of weapons and protection of forces through superior 
surveillance. Cruising at very high altitudes, the Global Hawk can provide 
battlefield commanders and decision makers with near real-time, high-resolution 
ISR imagery. 
Global Hawks carry both an EO/IR sensor and a SAR with MTI 
capability, allowing day-and-night, all-weather reconnaissance. 
Sensor data is relayed over CDL LOS (X-band) and beyond-line-of-
sight (BLOS) (Ku-band SATCOM) data links to its mission-control 
element (MCE), which distributes imagery to up to seven theater-
exploitation systems [11]. 
Once mission parameters are programmed into Global Hawk, the 
UAV can autonomously taxi, take off, fly, and remain on station-capturing 
imagery before returning and landing [14]. The navigation and sensor plans can 
be changed during flight by the operator in GCS.  
b. Background 
The Global Hawk completed its first flight in February 1998 and 
entered the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase of 
defense acquisition transitioned in March 2001. They entered the service for OEF 













    


















Table 2 and Table 3 compare UAV systems in terms of 
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III. OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 
When the United States Air Force’s scientific advisory board (SAB) 
conducted a study in 1996 on the role of UAV technologies in 
military operations, its principal conclusion was that UAVs would 
enhance the United States’ ability to project military power [15]. An 
equally important conclusion was that these vehicles could perform 
tasks that pose difficulties for manned aircraft, including attacking 
chemical-warfare and biological-warfare (CW/BW) facilities and 
suppressing enemy air defenses (SEAD). The SAB study 
concluded that UAVs are more survivable than manned aircraft and 
that, as a technological development, UAVs have profound 
implications for the American military force of the future [16].  
The effectiveness of UAVs in recent conflicts such as Gulf War I (1991), 
Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Gulf War II (Iraq) has attracted attention to the many 
advantages of unmanned, aerial vehicles in modern warfighting. The history of 
UAVs as used in military operations, including research and demonstration 
testing, has clearly revealed their weaknesses and strengths. It is important for 
other military forces to learn lessons and gain insight into how UAV utility can be 
implemented and improved. In military operations, UAVs are now playing 
valuable roles and are essential for sensitive and risky missions formerly 
performed by manned aircraft.  
This chapter focuses on how the introduction and increasing use of UAVs 
has affected U.S.-aviation combat tactics, based on four recent combined-force 
conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. In the material that follows, brief 
overviews of the roles UAVs played in these conflicts will be discussed. 
A. GULF WAR I 
The concept of UAV utilization did not emerge until operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm. During Desert Storm, UAVs emerged as a critical 
source of intelligence at the tactical level in addition to the American fleet’s 
manned tactical-reconnaissance assets. The force commanders’ need for cost-
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effective, unmanned, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting, reconnaissance, and 
battle-damage assessment (BDA) capability resulted in a search for concepts 
and platforms. The UAV applications and their operational success created the 
first general awareness and military-wide acceptance of the mission utility of 
UAVs [9]. 
In response to earlier operations in Grenada and Libya, the Navy 
started the Pioneer UAV program in the late 1980s. By the time Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army all 
operated UAVs. With 85% of the U.S.’s manned tactical 
reconnaissance assets committed in Kuwait, UAVs emerged as a 
must have military asset. Six Pioneer systems (three with the 
Marines, two on Navy battleships, and one with the Army) 
participated. They provided highly valued, near-real-time 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) and 
BDA, day and night. They often worked with JSTARS, the airborne 
battle management and C2 platform, to confirm high-priority mobile 
targets [9]. 
During Operation Desert Storm, high-level commanders using technical 
resources could view the entire battlespace, perceive detailed information about 
the enemy, and lead coalition forces to a new level of precise engagement never 
seen before. They used numerous collection platforms such as satellites, joint 
STARS, AWACS, UAVs, and others. The utilization of UAVs clearly 
demonstrated that the capacity to interoperate with other information systems 
provided a valuable battlespace view to all commanders, from tactical level 
commanders to operational decision makers. Before the Gulf conflict, assets that 
provided reconnaissance were manned, airborne platforms, including U-2, SR-
71, JSTARS, AWACS, Guardrail, ES-3, Advanced Tactical Airborne 
Reconnaissance System (ATARS) on F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft, and satellites. 
Manned platforms were adapted to multiple mission scenarios and could loiter in 
the conflict region with air refueling up to the endurance limitations of the crew, 
which was about eight hours. Crew limitations such as the reaction time to global 
conflicts, weight allowances associated with crew requirements and cost of 
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manned systems were the major concerns at the time. But the significant 
concern and limitation of manned platforms was the personal risk to the crew [9].  
Satellite reconnaissance could see virtually anywhere in the world for 
different time ranges, depending on their capability. Remote-sensing satellites 
gathered information via instruments across wide areas at no risk to life. Orbital 
mechanics generally limited a satellite’s coverage of a conflict area to about 
twenty minutes per orbital pass, with only about three to four passes a day, 
depending on target latitude. Continuous coverage of an area of interest or 
conflict region would require an expensive and large satellite constellation. Also, 
constant and predictable satellite orbits put enemies at a disadvantage whenever 
the satellites is overhead, and therefore adversaries conceal their activities and 
forces at times of overflight. Satellites considered as high-value national assets, 
used primarily by high-level commanders and decision makers to acquire 
strategic and operational intelligence for the tactical battlefield commander, 
turned out to be a major failure in the national information-systems concept 
during the Gulf conflict [9].  
Operations have proved that UAVs have the potential to fill the gap 
between manned aerial platforms and satellite-reconnaissance platforms. UAVs 
provide valuable capabilities to the battlefield commander at every level, giving 
near-real-time information by conducting direct and indirect gunfire support, day 
and night surveillance, rapid BDA, target acquisition, route and area 
reconnaissance, and battlefield management in dynamic threat environments 
and heavily defended areas where the risk to loss of a high-value manned 
platform is likely [9] [17]. 
According to the interim DoD report to Congress on Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm, UAVs performed direct and indirect gunfire 
support, day and night surveillance, target acquisition, route and 
area reconnaissance, and BDA. The Pioneer system appears to 
have validated the operational employment of UAVs in combat [9]. 
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After Israel’s success in UAV concept development and the increasing 
U.S. military requirement for a cost-effective, unmanned, airborne-
reconnaissance platform, the Navy started the Pioneer program in 1985. The 
major UAV employed during the Gulf conflict, the Pioneer complements other 
information systems and provides high-value intelligence for tactical commanders 
in the battlefield [9].  
U.S. forces deployed forty-three Pioneers to the combat theater, flying 330 
sorties and completing over a thousand flight hours. During the conflict, Pioneer 
UAVs enabled the Army to deactivate threat enemy artillery to support friendly 
forces. After that, the manned tactical fighters entered to the combat zone to cut 
off and destroy Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. The Navy utilized 
UAVs to monitor the Kuwaiti coastline and Iraqi naval facilities and search for 
mines. The Pioneer’s ability to spot each sixteen-inch round fired by U.S. 
battleships in real time increased the accuracy of the big guns. One of the 
primary uses of Pioneer was to fill the gap created by the retirement of the RF-
4s. Although the imagery resolution provided by Pioneer did not match that of the 
RF-4s, the BDA and target information significantly supported Marine air power in 
the battlefield [9].  
Because the Pioneer was an organic Marine asset, information 
from the UAVs went directly to the First Marine Aircraft Wing. This 
provided a notable increase in the availability of imagery for Marine 
aviation, which had experienced coordination problems in obtaining 
information from external sources. Despite requirements for 
resolution imagery higher than the Pioneer was able to provide, the 
increased information it did supply seems to have been significant 
in the application of Marine air power in the Gulf [18].  
The attack on the Iraqi-held Kuwaiti airport was another example of the 
utility of Pioneer UAVs. During that encounter a real-time Pioneer UAV image 
indicated a battalion of Iraqi tanks poised on the north end of the airfield for a 
counterattack. The Iraqi force was broken up by airborne and naval gunfire 
attacks before it could strike the advancing Marines [19]. In another instance, 
Iraqi soldiers surrendered to a Marine Pioneer during battle in Kuwait. During the 
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operations, the Pioneer UAV supported the U.S. forces with invaluable near-real-
time reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and BDA. The UAV 
operations in the Gulf War proved to be important in developing new concepts for 
further UAV applications and directly led to the development of Predator, 
DarkStar and Global Hawk [19]. 
The U.S. Navy flew the Pioneer for 213 hours and sixty-four sorties 
from the USS battleships Missouri and Wisconsin conducting target 
selection, naval-gunfire support, battle-damage assessment, 
maritime-interception operations, and battlefield management. 
Collected information was provided to both theater and component 
commanders, resulting in the detection of numerous Iraqi patrol 
boats, a successful strike on two high-speed boats, location of two 
Silkworm anti-ship missile sites, 320 ship identifications, location of 
antiaircraft artillery positions, and pre- and post-assault 
reconnaissance of Faylaka Island. As the war progressed, Navy 
Pioneers sent back images of surrendering Iraqi troops and the 
retreat of major armored units. The Army's Pioneers flew 155 hours 
and forty-six sorties, providing a quick-fire link that allowed the 
targets they identified to be quickly engaged by other systems. 
Army Pioneers also helped tactical commanders to conduct 
situation development, targeting, route reconnaissance, and BDA. 
Marine UAV companies flew 318 hours and 138 missions during 
Operation Desert Shield and 185 missions and 662 hours during 
Operation Desert Storm [19].  
In ten years, the U.S. Pioneer system has flown nearly 14,000 flight 
hours and supported every major U.S. contingency operation to 
date [9]. 
B. BOSNIA 
During the Bosnia War, friendly forces were not ground force-
complemented, as is usually done to identify targets for airborne systems. It was 
clear that virtually all targets were mobile and rapidly moved because of the 
unique Bosnian force-employment concept. The concept for targeting was to 
receive targeting intelligence from the combined air-operations center (CAOC) 
via UAV collection and fuse the data with stored area imagery and then send the 
result to a strike aircraft. As part of its advanced concept technology 
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development (ACTD) activities, the Predator was successfully deployed to the 
Balkans in support of NATO, the United Nations, and U.S. forces. The first 
deployment in the conflict involved three Predators with the payload sensors of 
electro-optical infrared (EO/IR) and line-of-sight and ultra-high-frequency (UHF) 
satellite communications (SATCOM) data links. Despite losses due to hostile fire 
and engine failure, the Predator system showed obvious improvements in 
operations during the Bosnian War. The system’s unique live video and dynamic 
re-tasking capabilities increased commanders’ battlefield awareness. Although 
the system was utilized effectively, adverse weather was the principle limitation 
for missions. The meteorological conditions such as icing, precipitation, high 
cross winds, and cloud cover limited the preplanned missions [9].  
The Predator helped determine the course of the Bosnia conflict. 
During September 1995, after several diplomatic and operational 
initiatives to relieve shelling and intimidation of civilian enclaves, 
NATO forces resorted to active bombing to bring the warring 
factions to the negotiating table. Many previous agreements to 
remove field weapons from the area had been broken, but NATO 
forces could not hold the violators responsible without confirmation. 
With Predators, however, weapons movements became subject to 
long-dwell video surveillance, and continuous coverage of area 
roads showed no evidence of weaponry being withdrawn. This 
single ISR resource thus gave NATO commanders the intelligence 
underlying their decision to resume the bombing campaign that, in 
turn, led to the Dayton peace accord signed in December 1995 
[20].  
In March 1996, Predators deployed again to the Bosnian AOR. Based on 
the previous experiences, the systems were modified to carry high capacity 
payloads supported by an expanded data-dissemination structure, and air-traffic 
control was provided via the Boeing system (AWACS). The enhancements 
included a tactical, endurance, synthetic-aperture radar (TESAR), an EO/IR 
sensor turret, an over-the-horizon, Ku-band satellite communications system, 
active de-icing capabilities for the wings, and an expanded information-
dissemination infrastructure. This deployment with advanced technology resulted 
in a Predator-generated imagery hand-off to an E-8 JSTARS in the first 
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demonstration of UAV/JSTARS interoperability. During the Balkan operations, 
the Predator system successfully integrated into the complex command, control, 
communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) architecture. [9]. 
The operations in Bosnia proved the ability of UAVs to provide reliable ISR 
to commanders and decision makers. During the conflict, the Predator UAV 
logged over 20,000 hours and made several combat deployments to the 
battlefield. The operations showed that the Predators provided critical and 
invaluable real-time target intelligence with other UAVs and ISR collection 
platforms [17]. 
At least three different UAV systems -the Pioneer, Hunter, and 
Predator- have seen action as part of U.S. operations in the former 
Yugoslavia. The U.S. Navy deployed the Hunter UAV to support its 
missions during the Kosovo conflict; the earlier Pioneer drone had 
proven itself eight years ago in the Gulf War. Target planners were 
able to watch live video feed of occupying Serbian soldiers and 
weaponry. The most significant advance in UAV technology, 
however, was demonstrated by a combination of the Predator UAV, 
commercial satellite TV, and a wide-bandwidth, secure, tactical-
Internet connection through fiber-optic cables and commercial 
satellite transponders. Known as the Bosnia command-and-control 
augmentation initiative, the Predator and other components 
transmitted live images to theater commanders via the Joint 
Broadcast Service. All that was needed to receive broadcasts was 
a twenty-inch receiving antenna, cryptological equipment, and 
authentication codes. Commanders could select from programming 
received over their 30 Megabit-per-second downlinks over direct-
broadcast satellites. Compared to the 9.6 Kilobit-per-second 
modems available during the Gulf War, that is over 3,100 times 
more data per second [19]. 
During Operation Allied Force, the Predator UAV was able to provide long-
duration ISR over the Kosovo engagement zone. Potential capabilities and 
missions changed rapidly in the UAV concept from strategic to tactical level. The 
political and regional conflicts have caused the DoD to step up and define 
requirements for UAV utilization in order to support an increasing variety of 
peace-through-war operations and the need for numerous types of UAVs to fill 
the gap in the operational envelope [21]. 
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C. AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan’s rough terrain presented a unique and complex challenge to 
U.S. fighter and bomber platforms seeking access. Although the enemy was ill 
equipped, with an archaic air defense, location and movement detection 
complicated U.S. targeting opportunities in an asymmetric environment. 
The air war in Afghanistan was apparently different from other conflicts. 
Due to the dynamic environments involved, strike aircraft missions had shifted 
from preplanned targets to targets of opportunity, or flexible targets. The fighter 
pilots and bomber aircrews had no detailed target information until after takeoff. 
The idea was to keep the aircrafts in a continuous orbiting over the battlespace 
until appropriate and valid targets were identified. The potential target information 
was transmitted to the fighters and bombers via voice or data-link transmissions. 
In Afghanistan, ISR platforms provided nearly twenty-four-hour coverage of the 
battlespace with responsive reporting and engagement of time-sensitive targets 
(TSTs) [22]. 
The Predator armed with Hellfire missiles became a hunter used to 
destroy both stationary and moving targets. With the Hellfire, the Predator could 
watch a potential target for hours and eliminate it without any risk to aircrew, 
combining the best of reconnaissance and strike assets cost effectively. The 
Predator operated as an airborne forward air controller and located targets within 
the approval time accomplished in minutes. Its geographically dispersed and 
protected pilot managed the flight and directed the strike, providing target 
information, altitude, and geographic deconfliction. Predators provided instant 
battle-damage assessment that allowed for immediate follow-on strikes [23]. 
The first Hellfire missile was successfully fired by a Predator UAV in 
Oct 2002 against a car carrying six Al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen. 
The Global Hawk UAV also saw its share of action in Afghanistan; 
however two of the five experimental vehicles were lost over 
Balochistan for technical reasons [24]. 
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In press releases issued on the 8th and 11th of February 2002, the 
Department of Defense confirmed that the CIA was using armed 
Predator UAVs in Afghanistan, and a reference was made to a 4 
February strike on a suspected Al-Qaeda complex near Zawar Kili 
in eastern Afghanistan [25]. 
As of 10 December 2002, the USAF was reporting that Global 
Hawk UAVs deployed in support of Enduring Freedom had 
generated surveillance and reconnaissance images of potential 
enemy targets in the course of fifty combat missions that exceeded 
a thousand flight hours in all [25].  
Returning to Predator operations, 3 and 4 November 2002 is 
reported to have seen a “weaponised” CIA Predator UAV used to 
eliminate six suspected Al-Qaeda operatives (including Qaed 
Salim, probable mastermind of the October 2000 attack on the USS 
Cole) in an attack on a motor convoy some 160 km east of Yemeni 
[25]. 
D. GULF WAR II (IRAQ) 
In Iraq, due to complex and dynamic environment, the U.S. needed faster 
and better intelligence gathering. UAVs have played a major role and become 
the link between information-age technology and industrial-age aircraft. The 
progress in computing, sensor technology, and improvements in wireless and 
network communications have made UAVs cost effective and enabled their 
proliferation. The capability of sharing real time data, images and video became 
the required features in UAV utilization. 
During OIF, the American Forces used multiple Predator UAVs to support 
CAOC operationally. CAOC was the air-operations center that supports joint, 
allied, and coalition warfare and plans, executes, and assesses aerospace 
operations during a contingency or conflict. Basically, the objective was to 
integrate the Predator’s common operating picture with the Falcon View mission-
planning system. In Iraq, Predators collected intelligence, launched Hellfire 
missiles, provided time-critical targeting information via streaming video to other 
weapon systems. In sixteen missions, it is indicated that, Global Hawks located 
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thirteen surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, fifty SAM launchers, over seventy 
SAM transport vehicles and over 300 tanks [15]. 
In OIF, the Global Hawk was given a chance to showcase new 
concepts in time-sensitive targeting with ISR assets. Although the 
U-2 had employed these concepts in 1999 in Kosovo, it was the 
Global Hawk’s unmanned attribute that allowed its employment in 
the OIF missile engagement zone during combat operations. As a 
result, even though Global Hawks flew only 5% of the OIF high-
altitude missions, they accounted for 55% of the time-sensitive 
targeting against enemy air-defense equipment [26].  
All four conflicts discussed in this chapter showed that UAVs have 
emerged as an important weapon of modern warfare, capturing the imagination 
of military planners and decision-makers. The technology that is being 
incorporated into the UAV systems is continually advancing. Advanced 
technologies such as synthetic-aperture radars, highly capable microprocessors, 
increased data-link rates, radar-absorbing materials, the use of high-bandwidth 
communications, and SATCOM-equipped navigation systems integrated onto 
UAV platforms making them an invaluable key asset to military forces. The global 
war on terrorism (GWOT) has directed attention to a primary UAV capability: 
intelligence gathering. UAVs provide high-resolution data; can be employed in 
unpredictably; can focus on a specific target area; and, depending upon the 
system, dwell over an area of interest or target for extended periods. They have 
shortened the process of searching, finding, identifying, and destroying a target, 
as known as, the kill chain or sensor-to-shooter cycle. Another key reason for 
UAV mission success is that their elevated flight altitudes and slow speed make 
them difficult for common enemy sensors to detect or recognize. UAVs offer 
advantages over manned aircraft in cost effectiveness, numerous applications, 
and preservation of life. The U.S. services have innovated with and employed the 
potential capabilities of UAVs in recent conflicts (i.e., arming the Predator UAV 
with missiles) [27]. 
The employment of primary UAV systems in recent conflicts, including 
Pioneer, Hunter, Predator and Global Hawk, demonstrated the potential of 
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unmanned platforms and gave insight into further applications. The challenge for 
the Turkish armed forces is to develop indigenous systems and concepts and 
improve current applications to meet national requirements. The primary 
technical challenge for world militaries is to integrate manned, UAV, and satellite 
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IV. UAV ANALYSIS 
This chapter focuses on evaluating UAV mission areas under network-
centric warfare, as well as several indicators used to assess UAV performance. 
To understand the importance of UAVs and how they affect tactical networks and 
combat tactics, it is important to explore the reasons, results, and impacts of UAV 
use within past, current, and future operating environments. A number of driving 
factors were considered in an attempt to characterize the UAV contribution to 
operational mission success. These factors, which include mission areas, 
characteristics, capabilities, limitations, and performance indicators, are 
discussed below.  
A. UAV MISSION AREAS 
To analyze the need, usage, and impact of UAVs for specific missions, it 
is important to focus on intended objectives, operational environments, and 
enabling technologies. Before specifying critical UAV missions for the Turkish 
armed forces, examining the change and evolution of mission types will set the 
stage for our study.  
The missions listed below were selected as critical to Air Force needs by 
the United States Air Force’s scientific advisory board in 1996 [28]. 
• Counter- weapons of mass destruction 
• Theater missile defense: ballistic missiles and cruise missiles 
• Fixed-target attack 
• Moving-target attack 
• Jamming 
• Suppression of enemy air defenses  
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  
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• Communications and navigation support 
• Air to air 
After UAV usage in the recent conflicts and demonstrations, the mission 
areas open to UAVs were listed in the DoD Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Roadmap 2005-2030. Although EO/IR/SAR sensors have been the predominant 
payload in recent conflicts, Table 4 identifies potential missions involving a 
number of other payloads previously flown on UAVs in proof-of-concept 
demonstrations. These demonstrations indicate that UAVs can perform the tasks 
and roles inherent in these mission areas and be a potential solution, depending 
on requirements. UAVs should be the preferred solution over manned platforms 
when the requirements involve the familiar three jobs best left to UAVs according 
to [11]: the dull (e.g., long dwell), the dirty (e.g., sampling for hazardous 
materials), and the dangerous (e.g., extreme exposure to hostile action). Table 4 
is a representative cross section of other payloads that have been demonstrated 
on UAVs [11]. It is not meant to be an all-inclusive list. Acronyms are expanded 
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(UAV/Payload, Place Demonstrated, Year) 
ISR X  X Pioneer, Exdrone, Pointer/Gulf War, 1990-91 
Predator, Pioneer/Bosnia, 1995-2000 Hunter, 
Predator, Pioneer/Kosovo, 1999 Global 
Hawk, Predator, /Afghanistan, Iraq 2003-
Present 
Hunter, Pioneer, Shadow/Iraq-2003-Present 
C2/Comm X   Hunter/CRP, 1996; Exdrone/TRSS,  
1998 Predator/ACN, 2000 
Force 
Protection 
X X X Camcopter, Dragon Drone/Ft Sumner, 1999 
FPASS, Dragon Eye, Pointer, Raven, Scan 
Eagle/Iraq-Present 
SIGINT X  X Pioneer/SMART, 1995 
Hunter/LR-100/COMINT, 1996 
Hunter/ORION, 1997 






 X X Pioneer/RADIAC/LSCAD/SAWCAD, 1995 
Telemaster/Analyte 2000, 1996 
Pointer/CADDIE 1998 
Hunter/SAFEGUARD, 1999 
Theater Air  
Missile Defense 
(TAMD) 
X  X Israeli HA-10 development, (canceled) 
Global Hawk study, 1997 
SEAD   X Hunter/SMART-V, 1996 
Hunter/LR-100/IDM, 1998 
J-UCAS/TBD 
Combat Search  
And Rescue 
(CSAR) 




  X Pioneer/COBRA, 1996 





X X X Aerosonde/Visala, 1995 
Predator/T-Drop, 1997 
Predator/BENVINT ACTD, 2002 
Counter 
Narcotics (CN) 
X  X Predator/Ft Huachuca, 1995 
Pioneer/So. California, 1999 
Hunter, Shadow/Ft Huachuca, 2003-2004 
Psychological 
Ops 
  X Tern/Leaflet Dispensing, 2004 
All Weather/ 
Night Strike 
  X DASH/Vietnam, 1960s 
Predator/Afghanistan/Iraq, 2001 
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Global Hawk/Iraq, 2003 
Exercise 
Support 
X   Predator/Joint Operational Test Bed System 
(JOTBS), 2002 
Navigation X   Hunter/GPS Pseudolite, 2000 
Table 4.   UAV Mission Areas (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030) 
UAV mission concepts have high practical and technological potential for 
strengthening the current Turkish armed forces’ capabilities by complementing 
existing force structures. UAVs could be used to gather target-location data, 
complementing manned aircraft or other UAV weapon employment. UAVs could 
gather this target-location data and attack the targets in autonomous areas of 
operation (i.e., designated kill boxes). Categories of UAV platform as well as 
mission systems and weapons that have been established for each major military 
mission are shown in Table 5. Table 6 shows UAV mission-system elements for 
each operational task. 
 
Mission Platform Mission Systems Weapons 
CWMD P-HAE (Find/Attack) 
C-MAE (Find/Attack) 
NBC Sensors,  
Target Geolocation,  
UGS Relay 
Penetrator Missile with 
Thermitic Warhead or 
Employing Sealant 
Foam 
TMD/CMD S-HAE (Find/Attack) 
P-HAE (Find) 
C-MAE (Attack) 
SAR/MTI Radar,  
Air-to-Air Tracking Radar,  
EO/IR Imaging Fire Control 
Hypervelocity Missile with 
IR Seeker and Kinetic Kill 






SAR, EO/IR Imaging,  
Target Geolocation,  
Fire Control 
Range of Choices 
Depending on Target 
Hardness; New Lethal and 
Small Warheads (Flying 







SAR/MTI Radar,  
Target Geolocation,  
Fire Control 
Wide Area Submunitions or 
Homing Missiles such as 
TOW, Hellfire, Maverick in 
Near-Term; 3.5 in. Modular 
Missile for Future 
Jamming S-HAE ESM Sensors,  
Escort/Area Jammer,  
Comm Jammer 
N/A 
SEAD S-HAE (Find) 
P-HAE (Find) 
C-MAE (Attack) 
ESM, Emitter Geolocation, 
Escort/Area Jammer,  
Comm Jammer 
Weapon Dispenser on UAV, 
ARM, or Dispensing 
Submunitions in Near- 
Term, HPM Warhead or 
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Submunitions on 
Hypervelocity Missile in 
Future 
ISR S-HAE (Find) 
P-HAE (Find) 
SAR/MTI Radar,  
Air-to-Air Tracking Radar,  
FOPEN Radar, 





Comm Gateway/Relay,  
GPS Augmentation 
N/A 
Air-to-Air S-HAE (Find/Attack) 
P-HAE (Find) 
C-MAE (Find/Attack) 
Air-to-Air Tracking Radar, 
Fire Control 
AIM-120 and AIM-9 In Near-
Term, Hypervelocity Missile 
in Future 





GPS Weapon Initialization, 
Weapon Launch System 
Table 5.   UAV Platforms (From: UAV Technologies and Combat Operations) 
Abbreviations:  
P-HAE: Penetrating, high-altitude endurance UAV 
S-HAE: Standoff, high-altitude endurance UAV 

























Radar         
• SAR X X X X X X   
• MTI X X X   X   
• Air-to-Air  X    X  X 
EO/IR Sensors         
• Imaging/FLIR X X X  X X   
• IRST  X  X
• LADAR/LIDAR X     X   
• Designator X X X  X    
• Laser Ranger X X X  X
ESM         
• Intercept/ X X  X X X   
Exploitation         
• Emitter X  X X X  
Special 
Sensors 
        
• Meteorology      X   
• Chem/Bio X   
• Nuclear X   
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ECCM         
• RF Sensors X X X  X X  X 
• EO/IR Sensors X X X X X  X
COMM         
• Data Links X X X X X X X X 
• Relay/Switch X X X X X X X X
NAV         
• Positioning X X X X X X X X
• Target X  X X X X X 
• GPS X  X X X X 
ECM         
• Self Protection X X X X X X X X 
• Escort/Area X  X X X    
Jammer         
• Comm X   X X    
Jammer    
 
Table 6.   UAV Mission System Elements (From: UAV Technologies and Combat 
Operations) 
 
Recent conflicts substantiated that theater commanders require a cost-
effective, responsive, long-endurance, real-time reconnaissance capability to 
collect, process, and report intelligence in any environment. The primary 
requirement for commanders and decision makers is the ability to obtain reliable 
data at any time and in all conditions. Endurance UAVs contribute to this 
objective and complement other information systems and platforms. The three 
types of endurance UAVs under development—low, medium and high altitude— 
are intended to provide flexibility and fill the gap in supporting various levels of 
conflict and risk. The primary advantages of UAVs, such as their usefulness in 
conducting sensitive operations without risk, provide operational flexibility to the 
theater commander that may not exist via manned platforms. Since their 
operating profiles differ greatly, threats to the Predator and Global Hawk will vary 
depending on the platform involved. UAV systems are designed to operate in any 
area, depending on how the airframe and environment might affect mission 
success [29]. 
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As DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030 indicated, for the next twenty-five 
years the DoD will focus research on mission areas including ISR, SEAD, 
destruction of enemy air defense (DEAD), electronic attack (EA), anti-surface-
ship warfare, antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, ship-to-objective maneuvers, 
communications relay, and derivations of these themes. The other required 
missions such as offensive and defensive counter-air and airlift missions will 
remain on the to-do list pending improvements in autonomy and cognitive 
capabilities [11]. 
The Turkish armed forces face emerging challenges. UAVs used in ways 
that enhance Turkey’s national power and promote force transformation appear 
to be a potentially strong contributor to those goals. Based on the results of 
operations in conflicts, demonstrations, and research in the missions discussed, 
the following UAV missions may be most critical to the Turkish military as it 
responds to national need: 
1. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
2. Time-sensitive targeting  
3. Electronic attack 
4. Suppression of enemy air defense 
5. Communication relays 
The source for the majority of the following information about critical UAV 
missions is DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030.  
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)  
According to [11], the ISR mission can be divided into three distinct 
segments: 1) standoff, in which collections are made while recognizing the 
sovereign airspace of other countries; 2) overflight, when ISR platforms fly in the 
sovereign airspace of another nation with or without consent but at low risk to the 
mission; and 3) denied, which is similar to overflight except the nation-state being 
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flown against possesses a credible capability to deny access. Space assets are 
usually employed globally in denied-access roles; however space assets cannot 
conduct unforewarned collection due to adversaries’ foreknowledge and hence 
repositioning of the collection asset. Only an aircraft possesses the ability to 
show up by surprise in a region. Together, space and airborne systems provide a 
collection architecture that can afford surprise, information dominance and 
situational awareness. The UAV advantages of persistence, flexibility and “no 
human aboard” provide significant opportunities to achieve unforewarned data 
collection [11].  
In peacetime, the majority of airborne land and littoral ISR missions use 
standoff techniques. Standoff UAV can also be used during military operations 
considered too risky for exposure of valuable platforms, or when political 
sensitivities mandate constraint. Standoff UAV designs need to emphasize long 
endurance so as to achieve the benefits of persistence. If broad-area coverage 
or extremely long-range sensor performance is required, high-altitude capability 
must also be emphasized [11]. 
Overflight concerns may be present in peacetime when political conditions 
support maritime surveillance, peacekeeping, or GWOT activities, or in combat 
when a sufficient reduction in hostile air defense has occurred. There is no broad 
set of capabilities required for overflight, unlike standoff and denied access. If 
persistence is desired, typically it would be achieved via long-endurance 
attributes in airframe shaping and engine choice. Altitude would likely be dictated 
by the mission equipment employed. For collections against very faint signals or 
requiring very high degrees of resolution, medium- to low-altitude UAVs are 
probably good choices. However, this introduces weather as a design 
consideration, since medium- to low-altitude aircraft must operate in areas 
plagued by icing and turbulence [11].  
It is indicated in [11] that airborne penetrating capability is advantageous 
because arriving unforewarned prevents the adversary from foiling data  
 
  41
collection by capitalizing on the predictability of orbits. But the disadvantage of 
traditional, manned platforms in a denied-access collection is the potential for 
aircrew loss and diplomatic problems. 
The “targeting cycle” is the cyclical activity of detection, identification, 
tracking, engagement, and assessment—this loop summarizes the pattern of an 
air force in a bombing campaign. Potential targets are found and their identity 
determined; if hostile, they are followed and hit; and finally the strike is evaluated 
to determine whether to repeat. One key measure of effectiveness is the duration 
of this targeting cycle [30]. 
By Desert Storm in 1991, intelligence dissemination had changed 
significantly. While many ISR systems still used wet-film techniques, many were 
digitized, permitting much faster transmission and processing. Internet 
technology and electronic mail permitted very rapid transmission of digitized data 
[30]. 
In 1999’s Allied Force campaign, the U.S. Air Force fielded a large fraction 
of its E-8 JSTARS fleet and deployed the new RQ-1A Predator UAV to gather 
battlefield intelligence. Operation Enduring Freedom was the first opportunity to 
apply the new generation of ISR systems. Afghanistan was swept by JSTARS, 
Predators, U-2s, Global Hawks, TARPS (tactical, air-reconnaissance pod 
systems) pod-equipped F-14s gathering radar and electro-optical imagery, and 
RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, EP-3E Aries and EA-6B Prowlers gathering electronic 
data, especially communications intelligence [30]. 
Persistent bombardment was coupled with the ISR constellation to 
achieve, on some occasions, targeting cycles as short as three 
minutes between detection and a bomber’s arriving overhead. 
Afghanistan became the proving ground for a new type of ISR-
driven air campaign in which persistent bombers waited in orbit to 
pounce on emerging targets as soon as the ISR constellation could 
unambiguously determine identity [30]. 
Focal-area surveillance assets such as Predator and Global Hawk UAVs 
can orbit for tens of hours with searching targets in a specific area of interest. 
  42
With advanced lower-power radars and optical systems these systems provide 
more detailed and closer information of the battlespace to warfighters with a 
smaller footprint [30].  
The Global Hawk was used more flexibly, both as a complementary 
imaging-surveillance system and for reconnaissance. The single 
Global Hawk used was claimed to have accounted for 55% of time-
critical Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) targets, including 
thirteen SAM batteries, fifty SAM transporter erector launchers 
(TEL), 300 missile storage canisters, and seventy missile 
transloader vehicles. It was also credited with 300 armored vehicle 
detections [30]. 
Coherent change-detection (CCD) techniques were also used in the 
Predator ground station. CCD takes terrain imagery from exactly the same point 
in space at different times and digitally compares the images pixel by pixel. The 
confirmed differences are highlighted in color as an overlay over the image for 
the analyst in quickly finding changes. This technique is exceptionally powerful 
and invaluable to use with both SAR imagery and optical or thermal imagery, as 
in predictive battlespace awareness. Though it deceive a human observer, a 
camouflage net in the battlefield is apt to produce enough shadowing or contrast 
difference for CCD detection [30]. 
2. Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST) 
The changing nature of warfare increases the need for special capabilities 
in an asymmetric environment. The developments that make UAVs ideal for time-
sensitive targeting are: 
• Increasing autonomy 
• Decreasing size  
• Smaller and lighter displays 
ISR sensor-to-shooter timeliness has improved since Operation Desert 
Storm. Despite terrain challenges and performance degradation, two E-8 
JSTARS aircraft were used successfully to direct airborne controllers and strike 
aircraft against targets of opportunity in the conflict.
 
In the absence of formal 
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targeting processes and training, creative processes were developed to 
disseminate information from sensor to shooter. For example, Predator UAV real-
time images were received translated in the CAOC into targets and passed to 
orbiting strikers for prosecution. In another case, a U-2 aircraft detected a 
possible SA-6 threat and disseminate the information to an F-15E for 
engagement [31]. 
A critical component of the find, fix, track, target, engage, and 
assess (F2T2EA) process was the ability of U.S. and coalition ISR 
assets to find and fix immediate Iraqi targets. Eighty U.S. and 
coalition ISR platforms, flying approximately a thousand sorties, 
supported the effort while space-based assets provided operational 
and tactical-level support that included Iraqi missile-launch 
detection. The ISR aircraft included RC-135 Rivet Joint, U-2, P-3 
Orion, E-3 Sentry AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye AEW, E-8 JSTARS, MR-2 
and R-1 Nimrod, PR-9 Canberra aircraft, as well as numerous 
UAVs, including the Global Hawk and Predator.
 
In addition, 
nontraditional ISR methods including the use of fighter targeting 
pods, and the B-1 moving-target indicator also contributed 
capability towards the huge demand for actionable intelligence and 
assessment [31]. 
The use of the Global Hawk UAV to maintain persistent ISR coverage 
over Baghdad resulted in a dramatic increase in actionable dynamic-target 
intelligence to the CAOC TST cell. The Global Hawk located up to fifty surface-
to-air missile (SAM) launchers, in excess of ten SAM batteries, and 
approximately seventy missile-transport vehicles. Once the Global Hawk’s 
platform became integrated into the Combined Forces Air Component 
Commander (CFACC)-prioritized DEAD campaign, the CAOC TST cell 
successfully prosecuted SAM-related dynamic targets, culminating with the 
effective takedown on the area of interest [31]. 
3. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 
UAVs have two attributes that are attractive for SEAD, strike, and armed-
reconnaissance missions when compared to manned assets: 
• Elimination of risk to crew 
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• Potential for greater survivability by reducing signatures 
through optimal shaping impossible with traditional manned-
aircraft design and through greater maneuverability (beyond 
human tolerance) [11] 
These attributes can be used to improve operational effect or reduce cost 
while maintaining the same level of operational effect.  
It is clearly stated in [11] that UAVs would be used against heavily 
defended targets for two reasons. First, a UAV can theoretically achieve levels of 
survivability that manned aircraft cannot. Signature control without the need for 
human caretaking becomes less difficult, and maneuverability could be increased 
beyond human tolerances if necessary to enhance survivability. 
In [11], SEAD is analyzed as two different types of missions: preemptive 
SEAD, in which a pathway is cleared prior to the ingress of strike aircraft, and 
reactive SEAD, in which the SEAD asset must react rapidly to pop-up, enemy air-
defense threats during the execution of a strike. Since closing with that threat will 
be required, the survivability of the vehicle must be assured through a 
combination of speed, stealth technology, and high maneuverability. Execution of 
both the preemptive and the reactive SEAD mission imply several critical design 
criteria for the UAV platform and mission-control system. These attributes would 
be similar to those of a UAV in a strike roll against heavily defended targets [11]. 
UAV accomplishing preemptive SEAD missions would also be expected to 
possess the following system characteristics:  
• Extremely high mission reliability, as follow-on force assets 
(many of them manned) will depend upon the protection of a 
SEAD UAV asset. 
• BDA so operational commanders can properly determine 
whether strike go/no-go/continue criteria have been met. 
o If BDA is organic, this reduces the reliance on other 
systems outside the SEAD UAV platform, but puts 
other design  requirements on the SEAD UAV that 
complicate signature control. 
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o If BDA is not organic, SEAD UAV design 
requirements are simplified, but complications arise in 
the integration of other ISR capabilities as a family of 
systems attempting to achieve effect in the SEAD 
mission. 
• Weapons optimized for concept of employment. If using 
direct-attack munitions (short range), then a robust signature 
reduction design, or standoff weapons with appropriate 
support from onboard or off-board sensors to find, fix, track, 
and target intended threats must be employed. 
• The use of direct-attack munitions is a major cost avoidance 
compared to the integration and use of standoff weapons. 
• However, standoff weapons provide an opportunity to relax 
signature design requirements and thus avoid significant 
low-observable costs [11]. 
Execution of the reactive SEAD mission implies further design criteria: 
• Enemy defensive systems’ operations must be detected 
rapidly, implying an onboard capability to detect threats or a 
well-integrated system of systems.  
• Reaction time from detection to neutralization of enemy 
defenses must be very short (seconds).  
• When using weapons to neutralize defenses, the flight time 
of the weapon must be reduced by the ability to stand in 
close to the target (high survivability) or by the use of a high-
speed weapon.  
• Robust, anti-jam, data links are required.  
• Reactive SEAD will require low-latency human interaction 
with the system or high autonomy within the system for 
determination of ROE criteria.  
• Reactive SEAD implies the integration of manned and 
unmanned aircraft in a single strike event [11]. 
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4. Electronic Attack (EA) 
Many of the attributes that make UAVs attractive for SEAD also make 
them attractive for the EA mission, because UAVs can theoretically achieve 
levels of survivability that manned aircraft cannot. Signature control without the 
need for human caretaking becomes less difficult. Additionally, maneuverability 
could be increased beyond human tolerances to enhance survivability. Finally, as 
stated before, should survivability measures fail, the use of an unmanned system 
removes the risk of losing a human life, perhaps the greatest reason for using a 
UAV in combat [11]. 
In developing unmanned systems for the EA mission and as discussed in 
[11], the following attributes are considered critical:  
• The ability to build a very stealthy unmanned vehicle could 
mean closer approaches to targeted systems, requiring less 
radiated power to complete the EA mission and the ability to 
detect and exploit much lower levels of targeted system 
radiation.  
• The potential use of high-power, directed-energy (DE) 
weapons or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons in future 
EA missions argues for the use of an unmanned platform, 
since the weapon may pose a significant risk to the crew of 
any delivery vehicle [11]. 
According to [11], the use of unmanned systems in the EA mission also 
brings several challenges: 
• When using EA to neutralize defenses in support of manned 
strike forces, it will be critical for the SEAD UAV to be within 
sufficient range to be effective. A systems-engineering 
tradeoff between EA effectiveness and survivability needs to 
be fully understood.  
• A UAV is more dependent upon outside communications 
than manned systems. Self-jamming (interference with 
command-and-control communications by electronic-attack 
emissions) could limit the ability to change the unmanned 
system’s mission once the electronic attack has begun. 
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o The potential for self-jamming and increased 
vulnerability due to a dependence upon 
communications means a great degree of autonomy 
will be required in the unmanned EA system.  
• A manned EA aircraft allows a crew to evaluate large 
quantities of tactical data on the threat environment and to 
change the mission plan as required for strike support. The 
appearance of previously unknown threat-defensive-system 
modes, frequencies, or tactics may only be detected by the 
human operator’s ability to recognize patterns in the context 
of previous experience, a very difficult, and as yet 
undeveloped, ability for autonomous systems.  
o Without the development of autonomous EA 
operating capability, the transmission of large 
amounts of data describing the tactical environment 
must be provided to remote human operators in real 
time. These large transmissions would be limited by 
available bandwidth and self-jamming and could 
increase the unmanned system’s vulnerability. 
• A signature-controlled vehicle loses the advantage of stealth 
when radiating. “Home on jam” threat systems could put the 
unmanned EA aircraft at risk.  
• Execution of the electronic-attack mission implies several 
critical design criteria and questions for the unmanned 
platform and mission-control system:  
o Mission reliability must be extremely high, as manned 
assets will depend upon the UAV for protection.  
o The tradeoff between effective apertures for the 
radiation of jamming electronic energy will have to be 
balanced against the negative impact on the signature 
and survivability of the unmanned system.  
o The EA mission will require a highly autonomous 
system that can operate and handle aircraft- and 
mission-related contingencies while unable to 
communicate with mission control (due to self-
jamming and covert operations).  
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• Reaction time from detection to neutralization of the enemy 
defenses must be very short.  
o Enemy defensive operations must be detected and 
countered rapidly. 
o When using EA to neutralize defenses in support of 
manned strike forces, it will be critical for the UAV to 
be within sufficient range to be effective. A tradeoff 
between EA effectiveness and survivability needs to 
be fully explored.  
• The EA mission implies the integration of manned and 
unmanned aircraft in a single strike event.  
• Robust, anti-jam data links are required.  
• The amount of energy required for effective EA is large 
unless the delivery platform is very close. The ability to 
generate this power could drive up aircraft size and cost. In 
addition, an aircraft small enough to go unobserved close to 
the target may not have the mobility (speed and range) to 
close the target or persist in the target area for a sufficient 
time. These considerations argue for the use of expendable 
jammers from unmanned aircraft as one means of delivering 
low-cost EA performance [11]. 
5. Communications Relay 
In [11], it is anticipated that to create a wide communications footprint the 
UAV platform must have extreme endurance, high altitude, and adequate power. 
It would provide an airborne augmentation to current tactical and operational 
beyond-line-of-sight and line-of-sight retransmission capability. A more focused 
footprint to support brigade-and-below combat elements will require tactical 
communication relays to address urban canyons and complex terrains. Support 
of the communications-relay mission will require continuous coverage around the 
clock and sufficient redundancy to meet assured-connectivity requirements [11]. 
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By 2010, existing and planned capacities are forecast to meet only 
44% of the need projected by Joint Vision 2010 to ensure 
information superiority. A separate study, “Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles as Communications Platforms,” dated November 4, 1997, 
was conducted by OSD (C3I) [11].  
The communications-relay mission primarily depends on the concept of 
airborne communication nodes (ACNs). An ACN is a remotely accessed, high-
altitude, tactical communications and networking node intended for use on UAVs. 
The primary conclusions regarding the use of an UAV as an ACN were:  
• ACNs have advantageous over satellites in tactical communication 
[15]. 
• Capacity and connectivity solutions can be enhanced with ACNs 
[15].  
• UAVs should be improved for meeting high-capacity 
communications needs [15]. 
ACNs can enhance theater and tactical communications capacity and 
connectivity by 1) providing more efficient use of bandwidth, 2) extending the 
range of existing terrestrial LOS communications systems, 3) extending 
communication to areas denied or masked to satellite service, and 4) providing 
significant improvement in received power density compared to that of satellites, 
improving reception and decreasing vulnerability to jamming. 
DARPA’s AJCN is developing a modular, scalable communication-
relay payload that can be tailored to fly on an RQ-4/Global Hawk 
and provide theater-wide support (300 nm diameter area of 
coverage) or on an RQ-7/Shadow for tactical use (60 nm diameter 
area). In addition to communications relay, its intended missions 
are SIGINT, electronic warfare, and information operations. Flight 
demonstrations began in 2003, and the addition of a simultaneous 
SIGINT capability is planned by 2010 [11]. 
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B. UAV CHARACTERISTICS, CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Pioneer 
The Pioneer UAV was procured to provide imagery intelligence for tactical 
commanders on the battlefield. Pioneer UAVs flew over 300 reconnaissance 
missions in combat operations during Persian Gulf operations in 1990-1991 and 
have flown in contingency operations over Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia since 1994 
[22]. 
It is indicated in [11] that the RQ-2A/Pioneer achieved less-than-desired 
reliability metrics. According to the analyses, this could be due to several factors. 
The Pioneer UAV was an Israeli platform purchased as a non-developmental 
system in an accelerated procurement. In operation, the users quickly identified 
several deficiencies that compromised reliability. General Charles C. Krulak, then 
commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps noted that: 
The Pioneer does not have an automatic takeoff, landing, or 
mission-execution capability and that has led to a high accident rate 
[11].  
The other factor was shipboard electromagnetic interference, which 
caused several crashes. Also, the engines were thought to be too small for the 
platform and easily overstressed within time. In addition to a more reliable 
engine, Marine Corps users found that the system needed a smaller logistical 
footprint and longer endurance as important requirements [11]. 
The current version of Pioneer, the RQ-2B, is essentially a digital version 
of its analog predecessor with modifications on RQ-2A airframes. The analog air-




The Hunter UAV was developed to support armed forces with near-real-
time imagery intelligence within a 125 km direct radius of action. The concept of 
communication relay exploited initially to an extendible range of 200 km by using 
another Hunter as an airborne relay. The primary mission was to provide a day-
and-night ISR and target-acquisition airborne asset to corps and Marine air– 
ground task force (MAGTF) commanders. The multi-role tactical Hunter was the 
Army's first fielded UAV served as an extended-range, multipurpose, fixed-wing 
air vehicle. It allowed the commanders to cover and search the area of interest 
by collecting and relaying real-time information back to ground control and 
mission-monitoring stations. After demonstrations, Hunters have been modified 
to carry munitions in addition to sensor payloads [22]. 
The Hunter UAV has automatic launch and recovery systems that utilize a 
rolling takeoff and landing to a hard surface. The design of the system makes it 
possible to operate from a paved or unpaved road only, with a minimum width of 
fourteen meters and at least 300 meters’ length at sea level. Experience proved 
that detailed site preparation would likely be necessary, unless the site were an 
airfield or other suitable location such as a highway. On the other hand, rocket-
assisted takeoff from an open area of 250 meters may be used as an alternative 
to launch the Hunter UAV. The operator uses an external flight-control box during 
launches and recoveries. Under normal circumstances, the UAV is returned to its 
base launch site and recovered by the operator, and an arresting hook at the rear 
of the fuselage engages cables to bring the Hunter UAV to a halt. In 
emergencies, a backup parachute-recovery system is utilized. The system uses 
GPS information in flight in order to compute UAV geographic position [22].  
The Hunter program has demonstrated many improvements and been 
used in recent conflicts within a wide range of payloads including SIGINT, 
chemical-agent detection, and communication relay [11].  
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The high mishap rate of the early Hunter is comparable to that of 
early Pioneers and, based on that similarity can be largely 
attributed to poor Israeli design practices for their UA in the 1980s. 
The significant improvement in Hunter’s mishap rate achieved since 
the mid-1990s is reflective of (1) joint government/contractor-
focused oversight, (2) a rigorous review and analysis process being 
put in place, and (3) qualitative improvements in a number of 
failure-critical components (servo-actuators, flight control software). 
[11].  
3. The Predator 
The Predator UAV is a theater-level asset utilized to provide cued and 
non-cued ISR and target-acquisition capability to warfighters. The vehicle can 
carry electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), and synthetic-aperture-radar (SAR) 
sensor payloads. The Predator’s launch and recovery takes place via hard-
surface runway operations. The UAV can operate both autonomously or under 
continuous manual control, although takeoff and landing must be manually 
controlled. The Predator pilots in GCS manipulate aircraft flight controls in real 
time using the LOS data link for takeoffs and landings. In flight, the pilot couples 
the autopilot to the navigation system, and the aircraft navigates to selected 
waypoints. The lack of beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications capability in 
Predator’s launch-and-recovery element (LRE) forces the system to maintain 
LOS until transferring control to the GCS. The pilot in the GCS controls the 
vehicle remotely and receives the required data from sensory products [11] [22].  
The Predator’s EO/IR sensors are in a gyrostabilized platform capable of 
rotating for a 360-degree field of regard. The EO subsystem has two colored, 
identical, daylight-video cameras with spotter and continuous-zoom lenses. The 
IR subsystem has three fields of view available in operations and a doubler for a 
total of six discrete fields of view, if required [22].  
The EO and IR payloads were designed to provide imagery of level 
six on the NIIRS (National Imagery-Interpretability Rating Scale) at 
15,000-foot slant range. NIIRS six corresponds to a ground-
resolvable distance of between forty and seventy-five centimeters 
(sixteen and thirty inches) [22]. 
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It is vital for airborne vehicles to be supported with a de-icing system 
comprising ice detectors that provide the capability to transit through moderate 
icing conditions at any time during the flight. Weather conditions are the primary 
limitation and concern in Predator operations. The Predator is not certified by the 
U.S. Air Force to operate in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) under 
instrument flight rules (IFR). In addition to IMC constraints, there are limitations in 
terms of launch and recovery under visual flight rules. For example, the Predator 
UAV cannot be launched in adverse weather with visible moisture such as rain, 
snow, ice, frost, or fog and the crosswind limitations for takeoff and landing are 
17 knots. The assessment of the operational deployments to the Balkans, 
lessons learned from three CONUS (continental United States) exercises, and 
one demonstration indicated that weather caused the cancellation of 17% of 
planned missions and early return to base (RTB) in 19% of missions flown. 
Predator’s weather limitations affected its missions and value to commanders 
negatively more than any other factor [22]. 
The Predator experienced low mission-completion rates during its 
initial deployment in the Balkans in 1995-1997. While the primary 
cause was weather related, system failures accounted for 12% of 
incomplete missions [11].  
The Predator carries four sensors: a daytime TV spotter, daytime 
TV continuous zoom, IR, and SAR; only the daytime TV spotter’s 
camera demonstrated the ability to recognize targets at a 30,000-
foot slant range with a probability of recognition of 0.69. The IR 
camera could detect the existence of targets (something versus 
nothing), but could classify them (e.g., tracked versus wheeled) 
only 21% of the time and recognize (e.g., T-72 versus M1A1) only 
5% of the time. The daytime TV camera could detect targets, but 
not classify or recognize them. In darkness or inclement weather, 
the sensor suite can detect but not classify or recognize targets at a 
30,000-foot slant range [22]. 
For missions where high resolution is an obvious necessity, such 
as BDA or reconnaissance missions to recognize and classify 
targets, the Predator must fly closer to provide adequate imagery. 
On the other hand, surveillance missions do not require such high 
resolution and adequate imagery can be obtained at longer ranges. 
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For surveillance missions, the IR sensor provided adequate 
imagery for all ranges collected, out to 38,000 feet, and the daytime 
TV provided adequate imagery between 10,000 and 22,500 feet 
[22].  
The Predator is vulnerable to threats because of its operating 
envelope. The MAE UAV’s concept of operations includes 
operating at altitudes no greater than 25,000 feet mean sea level 
(MSL), at airspeeds of 60-110 knots; 15,000 feet and 85 knots are 
the nominal altitude and airspeed. Additionally, the EO and IR 
sensors provide enhanced resolution at lower altitudes (5,000 feet 
versus 15,000 feet MSL). The threat to the Predator in this 
environment is broad: radio-frequency and infrared- guided surface-
to-air missiles; antiaircraft artillery; and second-, third-, and fourth-
generation combat aircraft equipped with air-to-air missiles, guns, 
and rockets. Notably, even with friendly air superiority, a Predator 
UAV operating at an altitude of 5,000 feet could find itself in the 
threat envelope of the less-sophisticated, visually acquired AAA 
and man-portable SAM systems. Although the Predator was not 
specifically designed to meet low signature requirements, its 
relatively small size, composite materials, and shape enhance its 
low signature. It does not contain an onboard EA system. 
Depending on its operating altitude for a given mission, it will be 
necessary to operate either in a standoff role or overfly target 
territory outside known engagement envelopes to defeat hostile 
SAM and aircraft systems [29].  
4. The Global Hawk 
The Global Hawk is optimized for reconnaissance and surveillance 
missions in low-to-moderate threat areas with supreme range and endurance. 
The imaging range of the UAV payload is 20 to 270 kilometers. The Global Hawk 
UAV is designed for fully autonomous operations during any mission from start-
up, to taxi, takeoff, mission execution, and recovery. The system is capable of 
fully automated takeoffs and landings on paved runways [22]. 
Global Hawk’s unique operating profiles, based on the air vehicle’s 
operating altitude at above 50,000–65,000 feet, enable the system to operate 
with fewer payloads and weapon systems capable of threatening the mission. In 
contrast to the Predator UAV, threats to the Global Hawk HAE system include 
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both high-altitude SAM systems and high-altitude airborne interceptors. The 
threats posed to the Predator would not be a factor against a Global Hawk HAE 
UAV mission. Standoff tactics and the use of onboard and off board early threat 
detection and warning capabilities will assist with dynamic threat avoidance in 
complex environments and enhance the platform’s survivability [32].  
The Global Hawk provided extensive mission support in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The LRE launched a Global Hawk from a 
forward operating location. LRE controls the aircraft via LOS 
common-data link (CDL), LOS ultra-high-frequency (UHF), and 
BLOS UHF radios. Shortly after launch, the LRE transferred 
mission control to the forward-deployed mission control element 
(MCE). MCE contains all the aircraft control functions of the LRE 
and provides for sensor control as well as receipt and 
dissemination of the product. The MCE maintains situational 
awareness. During combat operations, the Global Hawk initially 
flew a preplanned mission, but quickly transitioned to an ad-hoc 
operation [11]. 
Secure chat via Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNET) was established between the Global Hawk pilot/sensor 
operator, the liaison officer at the CAOC, and the intelligence-
mission operations commander at the exploitation center. This 
provided situational awareness and enabled command of the 
mission in response to ongoing operations and other emerging 
requirements [11]. 
C. UAV PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
As defined in [11], the highest priorities for improving UAV capability in 
combat operations are:  
• Improving tasking and collection efficiencies through a 
common, joint-use, ISR tasking and collection-management 
capability that integrates tactical and theater-level 
requirements and capabilities  
• Improving UAV data dissemination and platform access 
through the use of common, secure, tactical data links using 
less congested spectra  
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• Improving product access and better situational awareness 
of the current operational picture through improved 
distribution and networking capabilities  
• Improved delivery of critical, time-sensitive, actionable data 
to tactical units through improved mobile, two-way 
communications capability and associations  
• Improved cross-service-integrated UAV and manned 
CONOPS that provide improved overall collection capability 
[11]. 
These capabilities are vital for the success of critical UAV missions based 
on known UAV characteristics, capabilities, and limitations. There is no doubt 
that UAVs had, and are still having, positive impacts on the operations they 
support. But to analyze, evaluate, and draw conclusions of operational capability 
in a meaningful way, defining critical UAV performance indicators has an 
important role. 
Several performance parameters are identified in this chapter to highlight 
the features of UAV systems and allow these systems to be compared against 
conventional methods. The metrics include: 
1. Costs (development, procurement, and operations and support) 
2. Personnel-training time and cost 
3. Reliability and mishap ratings 
4. Imagery, sensors, and data-link capabilities  
Most of the following information related to UAV performance indicators 
was derived from [34]. 
1. Cost 
Currently, the per-unit and per-pound development and procurement costs 
of medium and large UAVs are similar to the costs associated with manned 
vehicles, as will be shown [26]. The U.S. Air Force continues to emphasize the 
application of advanced technology and processes for unmanned (as well as 
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manned) platforms, using common subsystems (manned and unmanned) where 
feasible. Additionally, the systems-engineering process looks for every 
opportunity to offload system requirements and gain design space through the 
removal of the man from the aircraft [26]. It can easily be seen that the exclusion 
of aircrew improves efficiency. Further, removing the man from the aircraft 
reduces developmental and operational time and costs significantly.  
At the beginning of manned aviation, the pilot-vehicle interface was not a 
big concern. However, the developmental resources spent on life support and 
cockpit design has increased with the complexity of aircraft.  
It costs approximately $17 billion to design and implement the F-
22’s advanced pilot-vehicle interface. Almost 30% of the total F-22 
cost is invested in the pilot alone. The cost of flight training for a 
single U.S. fighter pilot is now estimated at $2 million and rising and 
that’s just initial training cost. The maintenance cost of two 
thousand actively flying F-16 pilots runs close to a billion per year 
[33].  
In view of these human-related costs, removing the pilot results in 
significant savings in dollars and design burdens.  
While the largest potential for cost savings remains in the new 
support concept, opportunities for savings also reside in the 
acquisition of these vehicles. The development and fielding of a 
smaller, less-complex replacement for manned attack aircraft 
cannot be ignored. The reduction in size and weight directly 
attributable to a crew and related subsystems is conservatively 
estimated at 5%. However, substantially greater weight savings 
result from reduced load margins, elimination of man-rated 
components, reduced levels of redundancy, increased use of true 
composite structure (not just materials), extensive use of “more 
electric aircraft” components, and overall added simplicity [28]. 
Any full and fair comparison of manned and unmanned aircraft costs must 
consider the three phases of any weapon system’s lifecycle cost: development, 
procurement, and operations and support (O&S) [34]. Whether the UAV can 
achieve the same mission objectives more economically than its manned 
counterparts is more important than whether it can match performance.  
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Most of the information regarding to cost (developments, procurement, 
and O&S costs) below was derived from [34]. 
a. Development Costs 
According to DoD UAS Roadmap 2000-2025, UAVs have been 
developed for DoD use through:  
• Contractor initiatives (e.g., Shadow 200)  
• Defense-acquisition (milestone) programs (e.g., the Aquila 
UAV)  
• Advanced-concept technology demonstrations, (e.g., the 
Predator) [34] 
The shorter ACTD system-development timelines (3–5 years 
versus a decade or more) and lessened oversight requirements have provided 
an alternative means for several recent UAV programs to rapidly reach    
Milestone II [34]. The table below shows that the adjusted costs to reach first 
flight for both manned and unmanned aircraft have historically been the same. 
This is reasonable given that the engineering required to get a new design 
airborne for UAVs is driven more by aerodynamics and propulsion than by 
human factors and avionics [34]. 
 
Table 7.   Manned vs. UAV development costs (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2000-
2025)  
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b. Procurement Costs 
The aviation industry has long recognized an informal rule that the 
production cost of an aircraft is directly proportional to its empty weight (before 
mission equipment is added), which is currently some $1500 per pound based on 
Joint Strike Fighter in FY94 [34]. Estimates of the weight attributable to the pilot 
(ejection seat, displays, oxygen and pressurization, survival gear, canopy, etc.) 
are 3000 lbs for single-seat aircraft and 5000 lbs for a dual-seat cockpit, or ten to 
fifteen percent of the manned aircraft’s empty weight [34]. The costs and weights 
of UAVs are illustrated in Table 8.  
 














Dragon Eye $28.5K 3.5 1 $130.3K 8.14K 
RQ-7A Shadow $0.39M 216 60 $12.7M 1.80K 
RQ-2B Pioneer $0.65M 307 75 $17.2M 2.11K 
RQ-8B Fire 
Scout $4.1M 1,765 600 $21.9M 2.32K 
RQ-5A Hunter $1.2M 1,170 200 $26.5M 1.02K 
MQ-1B Predator $2.7M 1,680 450** $24.7M 1.61K 
MQ-9A Predator $5.2M 3,050 750** $45.1M 1.70K 
RQ-4 (Block 10) 
Global Hawk $19.0M 9,200 1,950 $57.7M 2.06K 
RQ-4 (Block 20) 
Global Hawk $26.5M 15,400 3,000 $62.2M 1.72K 
*Aircraft costs are minus sensor costs, and aircraft weights are minus fuel and 
payload capacities  
** Internal payload weight capacity only 
Table 8.   UAV Costs and Weights (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2000-2025) 
To illustrate this trade-off in procurement costs, compare a number 
of single seat F-16s at $30 million each with the cost of a “de-manned” F-16 ($25 
million by subtracting 3000 lb at $1500/lb) having a ground-control system (GCS) 
of equal cost, then with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA’s) UCAV counterpart costing $10 million each and a GCS cost equal to 
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that of two UCAVs ($20 million) [34]. The table below illustrates the procurement 
costs of F-16 and UAVs and potential savings based on number of aircraft.  
 
 
Table 9.   Manned vs. UAV procurement costs (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2000-
2025) 
The outcome illustrated on the table is that acquirement of a “clean-
sheet design” UAV has a greater potential in terms of procurement savings—in 
this case, two flights (four aircraft each) of the comparable UAV system for the 
same cost as one four-ship flight of F-16s [34]. 
c. Operations & Support Costs 
 Simply reducing weight by de-manning an aircraft doesn’t 
necessarily correspond to the total savings achieved by designing a clean-sheet, 
unmanned system for the same type of mission.  
Compare the objective of the DARPA/Boeing UCAV to deliver two 
1000-lb joint direct-attack munitions (JDAMs) over a 650 NM radius 
to using today’s F-16 for that mission. The weapon delivery 
performance for the two (i.e., 1.3 million lb-nm) is essentially the 
same, but the cost of the 7500-lb UCAV is estimated to be half or 
less than that of the 19,000-lb F-16. The UCAV is to have a design 
life of 5,000 hrs, half of which could be spent in combat operations 
under its CONOPS. The 8,000-hour F-16 will spend 95% of its in-
flight life conducting training sorties, accumulating some 400 hours 
supporting combat operations before retirement. The depreciation 
rate, in terms of dollars per combat hour flown, of the UCAV is one 
twelfth (six times the hours at half the initial investment) that of the 
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F-16 in this example, implying UCAVs could suffer twelve times the 
combat-loss rate of F-16s and still be cost effective by the 
standards applied to today’s manned fighters [34].  
Seventy percent of noncombat aircraft losses are attributable to 
human error, which also figures in a large percentage of the remaining losses 
[34]. Three factors mentioned in DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030 should combine 
in unmanned operations to significantly reduce this percentage: 
• UAVs today have demonstrated the ability to operate 
completely autonomously from takeoff through rollout after 
landing; Global Hawk is one example. Software-based 
performance, unlike its human counterpart, is guaranteed to 
be repeatable when circumstances are repeated. With each 
UAV accident, the aircraft’s software can be modified to 
remedy the latest mishap, learning the corrective action 
indelibly  
• The need to conduct training and proficiency sorties with 
unmanned aircraft actually flying could be reduced in the 
near term with high-fidelity simulators. Such simulations 
could become indistinguishable from actual sorties to the 
UAV operator with the use of virtual-reality-based simulators  
• With such simulators, the level of actual flying done by UAVs 
can be reduced, resulting in fewer aircraft losses and 
lowered attrition expenditures. Of 301 total U.S. F-16 losses 
to date, six have been in combat and the rest (98%) in 
training accidents. While some level of actual UAV flying will 
be required to train manned aircraft crews in executing 
cooperative missions with UAVs, a substantial reduction in 
peacetime UAV attrition losses can probably be achieved 
[11].  
2. Personnel Training Time and Cost 
Management of the majority of training requirements is carried out by 
contractors for all the DoD UAVs in operation today. With the exception of the 
Army's Hunter and Shadow training programs, each UAV has a dedicated  
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training program, underscoring the lack of interoperability among these systems 
in the field [11]. The table below illustrates the training programs of different 
UAVs. 
 
System/Course Service Location Duration(weeks) Throughput 
Flt. 
Hours Staff
Global Hawk Air Force Beale AFB, CA    10 
Pilot  26 48/yr 32 
Sensor Operator   12 18/yr 48  
Maintenance  5 77/yr*  
Hunter Army Ft Huachuca,    300**
Internal Pilot  24 40/yr 21.5 
External Pilot  16 4/yr 30 
Maintenance  10 20/yr  
Technician  11 20/yr  
Pioneer Navy OLF Choctaw,    37*****
Mission Commander  3 17/yr 10 
External Pilot  17 24/yr 102*** 
Internal 
Pilot/Payload   14 40/yr 56  
Mechanical  7 18/yr  
Technical  9 24/yr  
Predator Air Force 
Indian Springs 
AFAF, NV    22 
Pilot  13 48/yr 38 
Sensor Operator  14 48/yr 37.5 
Maintenance  4 95/yr****  
Shadow Army Ft Huachuca,    300**
Operator  24 240/yr 14.5 
Maintenance  8 40/yr  
Technician  9 40/yr  
*Number of graduates is total from the seven Global Hawk Maintenance courses. Duration is 
average length of the seven courses. 
**Total staff supporting Hunter and Shadow instruction at the U.S. Army UAS Training Center. 
***Consists of some 80 hours flying subscale RC models plus 22 hours flying the Pioneer. 
**** Number of graduates is total from the five Predator Maintenance courses. Duration is 
average length of the five courses. 
*****Total staff supporting Pioneer training at OLF Choctaw.




UAV training presents the first real opportunity to make maximal 
utility of the latest high-tech, high-fidelity, simulation systems. The 
difference between operating a console during a real mission and a 
simulation is minimal. UAV simulators can reduce training time and 
risks, especially in initial flight-training operations [29].  









RQ-1A/ Predator 23% 39% 11% 16% 11%
MQ-1B/ Predator 53% 23% 10% 2% 12%
RQ-2A/ Pioneer 29% 29% 19% 18% 5%
RQ-2B/ Pioneer 51% 15% 13% 19% 2%
RQ-5A/ Hunter 38% 5% 31% 7% 19% 
RQ-7/ Shadow 38% 0% 0% 38% 24% 
Table 11.   Summary of UAV failure (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030) 
As illustrated in Table 11, failure due to human and ground-related issues 
is a big part of overall failure. Also, such failure is significantly lower for the MQ-
1B Predator, largely due to the increased use of simulators for Predator training 
[11]. 
To assess the benefit of training, a study examined aviation 
accidents involving manned aircraft from 1987 through 1997. It was 
discovered that of 1,400 accidents involving thirteen models of 
commercial- and general-aviation aircraft, pilots who received 
enhanced training were 80% less likely to be involved in an 
accident. Furthermore, the data from this decade indicated that only 
about 20% of high-risk emergencies and maneuvers could be 
practiced in an actual flight environment. The remaining 80% are 
too dangerous to train in real circumstances (e.g., engine failure on 
takeoff, inclement-weather emergencies, stalls and spins) [35]. 
Based on the facts above, training similar to that of manned aircrafts 
would be beneficial for UAV pilots. For example, the benefit of training is credited 
with a favorable reduction in the percentage of human and ground-related errors 
between the RQ-1A and the MQ-1B (16% to 2%) [35]. It is possible to do such 
training economically. The manned-aircraft community needs costly simulators 
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with high fidelity to simulate the operational environment. By contrast, most UAV 
systems are already suited for a realistic training concept at their existing ground 
stations.  
The training implications of UAVs are potentially great. Today’s 
manned aircraft are flown over 95% of the time (50% for ISR 
aircraft) for peacetime training of aircrews, complete with attendant 
operations and maintenance costs because aircrews must practice 
to maintain proficiency. Remove the crew, and today’s costly 
training paradigm requires reexamination. UAV operators could 
receive the majority of their training in simulators, making their 
training and qualification significantly less expensive in terms of 
cost and time. By decoupling flight training from the number of 
training aircraft available, more UAV operators may be trained in a 
given period for the same cost as manned systems. More air-
vehicle operators would help mitigate today’s low-density, high-
demand operational tempo problem. Lower sortie rates could also 
lead to related reductions in certain support personnel, with their 
associated training and sustainment costs [36]. 
While per-unit procurement costs may rival that of manned systems, 
lifecycle operating and maintenance costs may be significantly less [26]. For 
example, operator training is done via robust mission simulators that reduce the 
need for training with the actual aircraft. Fewer training flights results in less 
maintenance and greater availability for operational use [26]. Today, flying-hour 
costs for the T-38 are $1500 and $3800 for the F-16. In comparison, flying-hour 
costs for the Predator are under $200, significantly less expensive [37]. A study 
reported the cost of training fifteen B-52 pilots to be an average of 
$685,051, versus training fifteen UAV operators at an average of $13,000 [38]. 
3. Reliability and Mishap Ratings 
UAV reliability is another important criterion because of the underlying 
affordability and mission availability of UAVS and their acceptance into civil 
airspace. Most of the information related to reliability and mishap ratings was 
derived from [35]. 
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Improved reliability offers potential savings by reducing maintenance man-
hours per flight hour (MMH/FH) and decreasing procurement of spares and 
attrition aircraft [35]. Some terms need to be defined to better understand the 
reliability of UAVs and manned aircrafts. These terms related to the reliability are 
defined in [35] as: 
Reliability is defined as (1) the probability that an item will perform 
its intended function for a specified time under stated conditions, or 
(2) the ability of a system and its parts to perform its mission 
without failure, degradation, or demand on the support system. 
Reliability is given as a percentage that represents the probability 
that a system or component will operate failure-free for a specified 
time, typically the mission duration [35]. 
Availability is a measure of how often a system or component is in 
an operable and committable state when the mission is called for at 
an unknown (random) time. It describes how a given aircraft type is 
able to perform its mission compared to the number of times it is 
tasked to do so. It is measured in terms of the percentage of time a 
system can be expected to be in place and working when needed 
[35]. 
A class A mishap rate (MR) is the number of accidents (significant 
vehicle damage or total loss) occurring per 100,000 hours of fleet 
flight time. As no single UAV model has accumulated this many 
hours, each model’s mishap rate represents its extrapolated losses 
to the 100,000-hour mark. Mishap rate is expressed as mishaps per 
100,000 hours [35]. 
Mean time between failure (MTBF) is essentially the ratio of hours 
flown to the number of maintenance-related cancellations and 
aborts encountered. It is expressed in hours [35]. 
Figure 6 shows the numbers of Predators, Pioneers, and Hunters lost in 
class A mishaps by year for the period 1986 through 2002. Class A mishaps are 
those aircraft accidents resulting in loss of aircraft (in naval parlance, a “strike”), 
human life, or $1,000,000 in damage [35]. These data show a cumulative mishap 
rate (i.e., class A accidents per 100,000 hours of flight) of thirty-two for the 
Predator, 334 for the Pioneer, and fifty-five for the Hunter (reduced to sixteen 
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since the major reliability improvements in 1996). In comparison to manned-
aviation mishap rates, general-aviation aircraft suffer about one mishap per 
100,000 hours, regional and commuter airliners about a tenth that rate, and 
larger airliners about a hundredth that rate [35]. 
 
Figure 6.   U.S. Military UAV flight hours and mishaps, 1986-2002 (From: 
UAV Reliability Study) 
These statistics make it apparent that UAV reliability needs to improve to 
become as safe as manned aircraft. 
In terms of achieving this goal, the declining trend in mishap rates, as 
shown in Figure 7, is encouraging. Both Pioneer and Hunter have achieved an 
order of magnitude improvement of 9.5 and 15 respectively. 
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Figure 7.   Cumulative mishap rate per 100,000 hours (From: UAV 
Reliability Study) 
  MTBF 
(hrs)








Requirement n/a n/a n/a n/a  
RQ-1A/ 
Predator Actual 32.0 40% 74% 43 
Requirement 40 80% 70% n/a  
RQ-1B/ 






Requirement 25 93% 84% n/a  
RQ-2A/ 
Pioneer Actual 9.1 74% 80% 363 
Requirement 25 93% 84% n/a  
RQ-2B/ 






Requirement 10 85% 74% n/a  
RQ-5/Hunter 
(pre-1996) Actual n/a n/a n/a 255 
Requirement 10 85% 74% n/a  
RQ-5/Hunter 






Table 12.   Comparison table of UAV Reliability (From: UAV Reliability Study) 
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Table 12 summarizes the reliability metrics for some UAVs examined in 
this thesis.  
 






Aviation 1.22 Data proprietary or otherwise unavailable 
AV-8B 10.7   
U-2 6.5 105.0 96.1% 
F-16 3.35 51.3 96.6% 




Boeing 747 .013* 532.3 98.6% 98.7% 
Boeing 777 .013* 570.2 99.1% 99.2% 
Predator/RQ-1 31 55.1 93% 89% 
Table 13.   Manned Aircraft Reliability (From: UAV Reliability Study) 
As illustrated in the table, commercial airlines have less than 0.02 mishaps 
per 100,000 flight hours. High-performance military aircraft have much higher 
mishap rates because of the dangers inherent in military flying. However, the 
mishap rates for UAVs tend to be much higher; the rate for the Hunter is fifty-five, 
Pioneer shows a whopping 334; and even the relatively advanced Predator, at 
thirty-two per 100,000 flight hours, has a mishap rate ten times that of the F-16. 
These numbers are somewhat deceiving though, especially for the 
Predator. This aircraft has much less than 100,000 total flight 
hours, so there has been less opportunity to fix design flaws. Most 
manned aircraft have high mishap rates when first introduced; the 
F-16 had a mishap rate of almost 175 during its first thousand 
hours of operation. The rate dropped quickly as flight time built up 
and flaws were resolved. If the mishap rates of the Predator and 
Global Hawk are compared to those of other military aircraft, they 
are not much higher for their relatively low flight hours, suggesting 
that, with equal attention to refinement, they could achieve similar 
rates. The UAV reliability report of the Defense Science Board 
suggests, however, that no such attention is being paid. Since lives 
are not endangered, there is less motivation to put money into 
analyzing accidents and redesigning the aircraft. However, 
particularly for the more expensive systems, if the lifetime of the 
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aircraft is considered, the cost of addressing design flaws early is 
much lower than the cost of so ignoring them [39]. 
4. Imagery, Sensors, and Data-Link Capabilities 
When UAVs were first employed for surveillance missions, they used a 
film-based camera to provide high-quality photography. This limited their role to 
performing BDA after preplanned air strikes.  
The camera system was not applicable to the dynamic nature of 
target acquisition because of the time it took to recover the UAV 
and remove the film for processing and exploitation. Although many 
UAV variants included a video link to the operator, the camera was 
analog and therefore limited in the quality and resolution of its 
imaging. These film and video systems were also degraded by 
weather and camouflage. Until recently, SAR sensor technology 
was not mature enough to allow cost-effective payloads small 
enough for UAV employment. Therefore, only manned 
reconnaissance platforms (e.g., U-2, SR-71, JSTARS, etc.) 
provided the flexibility, responsiveness, and quality needed on the 
dynamic battlefield [9].  
The electronics developments in 1990s have provided technology that 
enables UAVs to perform most battlefield reconnaissance missions more 
economically. Today’s electronics, microprocessors, and communications 
networks allow the Predator, using GPS navigation, to fly autonomously or be 
dynamically re-tasked in flight, loiter over an area of interest for twenty-four hours 
while collecting high-quality EO/IR and SAR imagery, and transmit that imagery 
over commercial satellites to warfighters at all echelons throughout the world [9]. 
We therefore have the technology to employ UAVs with capabilities as good as 
or better than their manned counterparts for imagery-collecting missions. 
Image collection with UAVs has some advantages, such as being 
economical and flexible compared to conventional image collection. Through 
recent developments, current UAVs have the ability to transfer images to earth 
receivers by VHF or UHF. Aerial, wireless-relay links are needed while UAVs are 
navigating beyond the communication capability of earth receivers to provide 
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persistent image transmission, but those links can be configured as well [40]. The 
advantages of UAVs as aerial data-relay nodes are lower cost, greater flexibility, 
and good compatibility. 
Recent flight operations of UAVs have demonstrated remarkable 
capabilities in airborne reconnaissance and surveillance. An 
integrated sensor suite (ISS), containing SAR, visible, and mid-
wave infrared (MWIR) sensors has been developed and integrated 
on the Global Hawk, to provide long-endurance, high-altitude 
tactical reconnaissance for theater commanders. The value of this 
multi-sensor system has been demonstrated for target detection, 
classification, and geolocation in all weather conditions, day and 
night. The system has been credited for contributing to successes 
in OEF and OIF. It has significantly shortened the time for 
transferring time-sensitive targeting information from sensor to 
shooter [41].  
The Global Hawk’s large payload, including SAR, EO camera, and third-
generation infrared sensor, has been reported to provide mission-support 
imagery three times more persistent than manned aircrafts’ [42]. 
The single Global Hawk operational during OIF flew only 3% of all 
aircraft imagery-collection sorties and only 5% of high-altitude 
missions, but collected data on 55% of all air-defense-related, time-
sensitive targets. The Global Hawk reportedly located at least 
thirteen SAM batteries, fifty SAM launchers, 300 canisters, and 
seventy missile transporters. It also imaged 300 tanks, 38% of 
Iraq's total known armor force. By comparison, the U.S. Air Force's 
U-2, which provided 80% of total imagery during Operation Allied 
Force in Kosovo, was used in Iraq primarily for its SIGINT capability 
[43].  
Global Hawk UAVs have the capability to remain on a specific station for 
twenty-four hours while carrying the full ISS at an altitude of 60,000 feet. The ISS 
collects radar imagery concurrently by either MWIR imagery or visible. Data 
collected is processed onboard, turned into real-time imagery and transferred to 
the ground station for multiple users. The operators can either preplan the ISS or 
re-task it dynamically in real time during flight so it can respond to emerging  
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needs in the battlefield. Each sensor can collect many thousand square 
kilometers of strip-map imagery per day and thousands of two-kilometer-by-two-
kilometer spotlight images per day [41].  
The Global Hawk sensors were designed as an integrated sensor suite. 
The ISS contains a synthetic-aperture radar, visible sensor, and MWIR sensor 
[41]. While the MWIR sensor provides high-resolution, day-and-night imagery, 
the SAR provides day-and-night, long-range imagery in all weather conditions. 
On the other hand, the visible sensor provides the highest-resolution imagery, 
but is limited to daytime operation only. Imagery may be collected using a wide-
area search (WAS) mode for maximum ground-coverage rate, or spot mode for 
detailed imagery of known target locations [41].  
In spot mode, coverage is 1,900 spots a day with spot size 2 km² to 
a geological accuracy of a twenty-meter-circular error of probability. 
In wide-area searches, the swath is ten kilometers wide and the 
coverage is 40,000nm² a day. The system can obtain images with 
three-foot resolution in WAS mode and one-foot resolution in spot 
mode [44].  
A ground moving-target indication (GMTI) radar mode is also provided on 
Global Hawk. The ISS outputs imagery and GMTI data in real time to a ground 
station via a direct line-of-sight data link or a SATCOM reach-back data link [41]. 
The requirements that UAV data links have to satisfy are mentioned in [45] as 
follows:  
• Maximum feasible range 
• High mobility 
• Low mass and size 
• High reliability and jamming resistance 
• High data rates [45] 
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The SATCOM link used in Global Hawk satisfies most of these 
requirements except low mass and size and some restrictions on jamming 
resistance. High overall-data rates in excess of 45 MBit/s are achieved by 
combining a number of standard 1.5 MBit/s SATCOM channels [45]. 
With their imagery collecting and transfer capabilities, UAVs have 












V. FUTURE DIRECTION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES  
Technological advancements and growth in the capabilities and scope of 
current UAV systems raise the question, “what range of near and long term UAV 
capabilities is possible?” This chapter aims to answer by exploring trends, 
including processor, communications, platform and sensor technologies, and 
potential UAV capabilities and associated missions. Also discussed is the 
employment of new UAVs and some current experiments. Most of the 
information in Chapter V was derived from [11]. 
A. TECHNOLOGY  
Unmanned aviation has spurred many key technical advances in aviation 
such as the inertial navigation system (INS), the autopilot, and digital data links. 
Although UAV development was hampered by lack of technology throughout 
most of the 20th century, some basic problems of automatic stabilization, remote 
control, and autonomous navigation have been overcome by military research. 
The last several decades saw improvement in the technologies that support 
these capabilities, largely through the integration of increasingly capable 
microprocessors in UAV mission-management computers and flight controls [11]. 
A fully autonomous flight (from takeoff to landing without human intervention) 
was performed by a UAV as early as 1989. Advancements in the biological and 
nano sciences and continually improving microprocessors are influencing military 
aviation in near- and long-term tactics and planning [11]. We’ve come a long way 
since 1989. 
The two basic approaches to implementing unmanned flight, 
autonomy (illustrated by the RQ-4) and pilot-in-the-loop (illustrated 
by the MQ-1), rely predominantly on microprocessor and 
communication (and associated data link) technology, respectively. 
While both technologies are used to differing levels in all current 
UAVs, it is these two technologies that compensate for the absence 
of an onboard pilot and thus enable unmanned flight. Advances in 
both are driven today by their commercial markets, the personal 
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computer industry for microprocessors and the wireless 
communication industries for data protection and compression to 
enhance throughput. This chapter focuses on forecasting trends in 
these technologies over the coming two decades [11]. 
The directors of the service research laboratories have adopted a layered, 
onion-like series of capabilities to define the autonomy of UAV sophistication. 
These definitions run the gamut from tele-operated and preprogrammed flight by 
single aircraft to self-actualizing group flight [11]. Figure 8 illustrates where 
example UAVs stand in comparison with a ranked set of ten autonomy levels. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Trend in UAV Autonomy (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-
2030) 
1. Processor Technologies 
Although today's processors allow UAVs to fly entire missions with little or 
no human intervention, if the ultimate goal is to replace a pilot with a mechanical 
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facsimile of equal or superior thinking speed, memory capacity, and response 
times (algorithms) gained from training and experience, then processors of 
human-like speed, memory, and situational adaptability are necessary [11].  
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate processor-technology progress since 1940, 
projected to 2030. The figures show that today's supercomputers are within a 
factor of 10 of achieving human equivalence in speed and capacity and will likely 
achieve human equality by 2015. The cost of a supercomputer is uncompetitive 
with that of a trained human; but for comparison, by 2030 the cost of a hundred-
million-million-instructions-per-second (MIPS) processor should approach 
$10,000 [11].  
 
Figure 9.   Trend in processor speed (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-
2030) 
As shown in Figure 10, human capabilities are generally agreed to equate 
to 100 million MIPS in speed and 100 million megabytes (MB) in memory [11]. 
The dotted boundary in the above curve crosses this same capability level for 
computers in roughly the year 2015. 
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Figure 10.   Relationship of processor speed and memory (From: DoD UAS 
Roadmap 2005-2030) 
2. Communications Technologies 
The main issues in today’s communications technologies are flexibility, 
adaptability, and controllability of bandwidth, frequency, and information/data 
flows (e.g. separate data routing in terms of priority and latency) [11]. This means 
that network services such as C2, data management, and data-flow controls will 
be integrated into the systems and concepts of operation (CONOPS) of the net-
centric environment of the future. Reusing certain communications paths in 
different ways (such as restrictions on power and operating range) will be the 
solution to spectrum and bandwidth issues. 
a. Data Links 
The rapid improvements achieved in airborne data-link rates and 
processor speeds are the key enablers of future UAV capabilities. The ideal use 
of data links today, and in the near-term, is to relay all airborne data to ground-
support services and process it there for decision making. Eventually, onboard 
processing power and data-link capabilities will allow UAVs to relay processed 
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and analyzed airborne data to ground stations for interpretation and decision 
making. It is expected that data-link rate requirements in certain applications 
such as imagery collection will drop significantly. Also, the existence of band-
limited communications will continue to require data compression for the data 
transfer, although the near-term throughput requirements of advanced sensors 
are unlikely to be solved by data-compression algorithms only [11]. 
Airborne optical data links, or lasercom, will potentially offer data 
rates two to five orders of magnitude greater than those of the best 
future RF systems. However, lasercom data rates have held steady 
for two decades because their key technical challenge was 
adequate pointing, acquisition, and tracking (PAT) technology to 
ensure the laser link was both acquired and maintained. Although 
mature RF systems are viewed as lower risk, and therefore attract 
investment dollars more easily, Missile Defense Agency funding in 
the 1990s allowed a series of increasingly complex demonstrations 
at Gbps rates. The small apertures (3 to 5 inches) and widespread 
availability of low power semiconductor lasers explains why 
lasercom systems consume less power and provide for lower 
signatures, greater security, and better jam resistance [11]. 
Radio frequency (RF) is likely to remain dominant at lower altitudes 
because of its better all-weather capability, even though it can be exceeded by 
lasercom in terms of data-transfer rates. Rates of up to 10 Gbps (forty times 
currently fielded capabilities) are considered possible at current bandwidths [11]. 
As a result, both RF and lasercom should continue to progress in order to handle 
future data-flow and transfer requirements. 
b. Network-Centric Communications 
Highflying UAVs, such as the Global Hawk or Predator, provide 
coverage that lends itself well to network-backbone and transit-networking 
applications [11]. Fielding these services depends on the migration of the 
networked communications capabilities to provide capacity, stability, reliability 




perfect in terms of providing theater backbone services. On the other hand, 
smaller UAVs can also provide similar networking services and capability but on 
a smaller scale. 
Concepts that need development in future UAVs and networks are 
identified in [11] as:  
• the role of autonomy  
• the definition of team coordination, cooperation, and 
collaboration  
• the role of cognitive decision aids  
• the importance of airspace layer and control [11] 
3. Platform Technologies 
a. Airframe 
Future aircraft projects may require cooperation between 
bioengineers and aerospace engineers. The need for stronger but lighter 
aerostructures precipitated an evolution from wood and canvas to aluminum, 
titanium, and composites; transgenetic biopolymers are seen as the next step in 
aircraft skins. One biopolymer nearing commercialization has twice the tensile 
strength of steel yet is twenty-five percent lighter than carbon composites, and is 
flexible [11]. In an aircraft skin made of such a biopolymer, the servo actuators, 
hydraulics, electric motors, and control rods of today's aircraft-control surfaces 
could be replaced by the ability to warp wings and stabilizers by flexing their skin, 
much as the Wright brothers first conceived [11]. The material can responsively 
shape itself in order to reduce reflection. This ability of the material and its nature 
can enhance the signature control. 
Even though composites have enabled lighter airframes, the repair 
of damaged composites is weaker than the original because of the 
loss of the material's originally played construction, which is called 
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aeroelastic tailoring. Researchers have recently developed a 
material called autonomic, or self-repairing material that has 
embedded microcapsules of "glue". In case of a damaged skin 
area, the capsules will open and seal the crack before it can 
propagate. Another material, which will be of most value in long 
endurance and strike UAVs, is called isomers. They are self-
healing, in which the damaged structure regenerates itself to original 
condition and are still being researched [11]. 
b. Control 
Future UAVs will be increasingly independent vehicles able to 
assess, receive, and take action to perform general and tailored missions. This 
level of autonomy—particularly in platforms carrying weapons—requires 
sophisticated machine and computer processing linked to the more variable 
processing capabilities of human beings. Moore's Law predicts the speed of 
microprocessors will reach parity with the human brain around 2015, while others 
estimate the capacity of a personal computer will equal that of human memory 
closer to 2030 [11]. 
As for those UAVs remaining under human control, the controller 
will eventually be linked to his remote charge through his own 
neuromuscular system. Today's ground station vans are already 
being superseded by wearable harnesses with joysticks and face 
visors allowing the wearer to "see" through the UAV sensor, 
regardless of where he faces. Vests will soon provide him the 
tactile sensations "felt" by the UAV when it turns or dives or 
encounters turbulence. Eventually, UAV pilots will be wired so that 
the electrical signals they send to their muscles will translate into 
instantaneous control inputs to the UAV. To paraphrase a popular 
saying, “the future UAV pilot will transition from seeing the plane to 
being the plane [11]”. 
c. Propulsion 
UAVs already exploit more forms of propulsion than do manned 
aircraft—from traditional gas turbines and reciprocating engines to batteries and 
solar power—and are exploring scramjets, fuel cells, reciprocating chemical 
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muscles, beamed power, and even nuclear isotopes [11]. In the past, military-
sponsored research used to lead the technological advances in propulsion. 
However, these advances are now driven by the commercial sector (e.g. 
advances in fuel cells by the automotive industry and batteries by the computer 
industry.) UAVs are therefore more likely to rely on commercial, off-the-shelf 
(COTS) or COTS-derivative power plants than their manned predecessors were; 
Global Hawk and Dark Star both selected business-jet engines in their design 
[11]. Since UAV power-plant endurance is considered a paramount superior 
attribute over manned counterparts, propulsion technologies remain crucial.  
4. Payload Technologies 
DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030 divides payloads currently in use on UAVs 
into four general categories: 
• sensors (electro-optical, radar, signals, meteorological, 
chemical-biological) 
• relay (communications, navigation signals) 
• weapons 
• cargo (leaflets, supplies) [11]. 
a. Sensors 
Requirements for UAV sensing payloads extend beyond 
intelligence collection, reconnaissance surveillance, target acquisition and real-
time operational support into weapons delivery. This is due primarily to high 
reliance on target detection and identification to meet rules of engagement (ROE) 
constraints while maintaining accuracy [11].  
The main requirement for sensing is mentioned in [11] as: 
• imaging (visible, infrared, and radar) 
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• signals (for the SIGINT and SEAD missions) 
• chemical, biological, and radiological (WMD) 
• meteorological (METOC) 
• magnetic (antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and mine 
countermeasures (MCM)) [11]. 
Figures 11 through 15 depict expected developments in imaging, 
signals, and measurement and signal-intelligence (MASINT) sensors over the 
next twenty years by technology and by system, as well as describing the 
regimes in which such sensors must perform, the enablers necessary to improve 
present capabilities, and the missions for which each is applicable [11]. Figure 16 
then forecasts developments by sensor type between 2005 and 2015. 
Terms in the following figures are defined as follows: 
Automatic Target Cueing / Automatic Target Recognition 
(ATC/ATR): The ability of an algorithm or device to recognize and cue targets or 
objects based on data obtained from sensors [46] 
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP): 
A "modular, active, electronically scanned, array-radar system" designed to be 
scaled in size so it can be carried aboard different platforms such as UAVs [47] 
Foliage penetration (FOPEN): An airborne VHF/UHF, dual-band, 
synthetic-aperture radar for imaging concealed targets [48] 
Digital Terrain-Elevation Data (DTED): A uniform matrix of 
terrain-elevation values that provides basic quantitative data for systems and 
applications requiring terrain elevation, slope, or surface roughness [49] 
Electronically Scanned Array (ESA): A type of radar whose 
transmitter and receiver functions are composed of numerous small 
transmit/receive (T/R) modules [50]. 
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Ground / Airborne Moving-Target Indicator (GMTI/AMTI): 
Ground- or aerial-vehicle tracking system that uses Doppler frequency shift 
frequency in the returned signal to distinguish moving ground vehicles from 
stationary surroundings [51]. 
Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR): An optical, remote-
sensing technology that measures properties of scattered light to find range and 
other information of a distant target [52]. 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): A category of intelligence 
comprising (individually or in combination) all communications, electronic, and 
foreign-instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted [7]. 
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT): Intelligence 
obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angular, spatial, 
wavelength, time dependent, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived 
from technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features 
associated with the emitter or sender and to facilitate subsequent identification 
and measurement of the same [7]. 
Communications Intelligence (COMINT): Technical information 
and intelligence derived from foreign communications by unintended recipients 
[7]. 
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT): Technical and geolocation 
intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations 








Figure 12.   Motion/Video-Imagery Sensor Technology Forecast (From: DoD 
UAS Roadmap 2005-2030) 
 
 












Figure 16.   Forecast Sensor Capabilities (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-
2030) 
b. Communication Relay 
By 2010, existing and planned capacities are forecast to meet only 
forty-four percent of the need projected by Joint Vision 2010 to ensure 
information superiority [11]. A separate study, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as 
Communications Platforms, dated November 4, 1997, was conducted by the 
office of the secretary of defense. Its major conclusions regarding the use of an 
UAV as an ACN were: 
• Tactical communication needs can be met much more 
responsively and effectively with ACNs than with satellites.  
• ACNs can effectively augment theater satellite capabilities 
by addressing deficiencies in capacity and connectivity.  
• Satellites are better suited than UAVs for meeting high-
capacity, worldwide communications needs. 
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According to [11], ACNs can enhance intra-theater and tactical 
communications capacity and connectivity by: 
• providing more efficient use of bandwidth  
• extending the range of existing terrestrial LOS 
communications systems 
• extending communication to areas denied or masked to 
satellite service 
• providing significant improvement in received power density 
compared to that of satellites, improving reception and 
decreasing vulnerability to jamming [11]. 
DARPA’s AJCN is developing a modular, scalable, communication-
relay payload that can be tailored to fly on an RQ-4/Global Hawk 
and provide theater-wide support (300 nm diameter area of 
coverage) or on an RQ-7/Shadow for tactical use (60 nm diameter 
area). In addition to communications relay, its intended missions 
are SIGINT, electronic warfare (EW), and information operations 
(IO). Flight demonstrations began in 2003, and the addition of a 
simultaneous SIGINT capability is planned by 2010 [11]. 
c.  Weapons 
Since UAVs will have smaller weapons than manned counterparts, 
their lethality must be increased for equal or greater mission effectiveness. 
Increasing lethality with smaller weapons requires either more precise guidance 
or more lethal warheads. With the advent of some innovative wide-kill-area 
warheads, hardening guidance systems (e.g., resistance to GPS jamming) 
appears to be the imperative technological requirement [11]. A potentially 
significant advantage to smaller, more precise, weapons and penetrating launch 
platforms such as J-UCAS is reduction in collateral damage. In some cases, 
these platform and weapons combinations could reduce an adversary’s ability to 
seek sanctuary within noncombatant areas [11].  
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B.  CAPABILITIES  
This section brings together the requirements and desired capabilities with 
emerging technological and operational opportunities in an effort to stimulate the 
planning process for UAV development over the next twenty-two years [11].  
To relate the warfighter priorities to the technologies coming available 
within the next twenty-two years, examples of capability metrics illustrated on 
Table 14 were derived from DoD UAV Roadmap 2005. They define availability 
timeframes for anticipating when capabilities will be. All references to years refer 
to the dates these capabilities are expected to come available, based on the 
technological trends presented at the beginning of the chapter. By bringing 
together a plot of the predicted appearance of the listed capabilities in Table 14 
with the timeline of current and planned DoD UAV programs, a roadmap of 

























BA, FL Endurance Field a heavy fuel-powered tactical UAV 2005-10 
BA ’’ Field fully automated aerial refueling capability 2010-15 
BA ’’ Achieve 40% increased time-on-station with same fuel load 2015-20 
FP Signature Field an UAV inaudible from 500 to 1,000 ft slant range 2005-10 
BA, FA Resolution Field a sensor for detecting targets under trees 2005-10 
FP ’’ Distinguish facial features (identify individuals) from 4 nm 2005-10 
BA, FA ” Achieve 3 inch resolution in SAR resolution over a 20 nm wide swath 2010-15 
BA Data Rate Relay entire COMINT spectrum in real time 2005-10 
BA ” Relay entire ELINT spectrum in real time 2025-30 
BA, FA ” Relay 100-band hyper-spectral imagery in real time 2010-15 
BA, FA ” Relay 1,000-band ultra-spectral imagery in real time 2025-30 
BA, FA Algorithm Processor 
Automatic Target Recognition capability 
for large numbers of military vehicles 2005-10 
C2 Processor Speed 
Provide human-equivalent processor 
speed and memory in PC size for 
airborne use 
2025-30 
BA, FP ” Map surf zone sea mines in real time 2015-20
BA, FA, FL ” Reduce DTED level 5 data in real time 2020-25
* Based on Joint Functional Capabilities identified in COCOM IPLs.
BA = Battlespace Awareness; FL = Focused Logistics; FP = Force Protection; C2 = 
Command and Control FA = Force Application 
Table 14.   Example Capability Metrics (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030) 
The upper half of Figure 17 plots the predicted appearance of capabilities 
over the next twenty-two years, with the dates centered within a five-year window 
of estimated availability for fielding. As an example (see dotted lines on Figure 
17), the information-processing speed needed to extract the presence of sea 




available between 2015 and 2020, which corresponds to the planned introduction 
of the naval variant of J-UCAS—making this a reasonable capability to express 
as a requirement, if desired [11]. 
The terms used in the following figure are defined as follows: 
Heavy-Fuel Engines (HFE): Engines using heavy fuels (JP-5, JP-8 and 
diesel) versus gasoline [53] 
Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC): An engineering term that describes the 
fuel efficiency of an engine design with respect to a mechanical output [54]. 
 
Figure 17.   UAV Capabilities Roadmap (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-
2030) 
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C. MISSIONS  
UAV missions have historically been limited to ISR (Global Hawk) and 
strike (Predator) missions. Taking the man from the cockpit can translate into 
persistent, safe surveillance and fewer of sorties. Fewer flight hours are lost due 
to the transit time that shorter-range aircraft require [11]. Reduced sorties mean 
fewer takeoffs and landings, reduced wear and tear, and less opportunity for pilot 
mishap. Similarly, reduced sorties affect ground operating tempo. The ability to 
operate in distant theaters using CONUS ground stations means affected crews 
can fly operational missions without deploying forward, i.e., reduced in-theater 
footprint and support costs, including less demand for force-protection 
components [11]. Fewer deployments also leads to less family stress, as well as 
reduced maintenance and training costs.  
High-endurance, unmanned aviation enables CONOPs attributes 
that can’t be fully reflected in aircraft unit costs. But they enable a 
future where counter-air operations may quite conceivably be 
supported by crews, operational staffs and CAOCs that 
substantially remain in either CONUS or established headquarters 
far away from the point of intended operational effects. The J-
UCAS program, which focused on developing a network-centric 
strike capability, will let us take another step toward such a future 
[11].  
As shown in the Figure 18, two major families of missions, one 
emphasizing payload capacity and persistence and the other autonomy, 
survivability, and weapons employment, need to drive UAV design and 




Figure 18.   UAV Missions Roadmap (From: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-
2030) 
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 In the upper half of Figure 18, endurance UAVs are employed as 
communication relays, SIGINT collectors, tankers, maritime-patrol aircraft, and 
airlifters. Design-wise, these roles may use one or assorted common platforms, 
but they must provide significant payload capacities (power as well as weight) 
and endurances greater than twenty-four hours [11].  
The DARPA AJCN, with the potential to deploy a Global Hawk-
based communication relay payload in the 2005-2010 timeframe, 
represents a significant step in the “payload with persistence” 
direction for UAVs. From there, the mission similarities of the AJCN 
and the Global Hawk imagery reconnaissance UAV could be 
combined in an unmanned SIGINT collection platform by placing 
the mission crews of the Rivet Joint, ARIES II, and Senior Scout 
aircraft in vans on the ground, as is accomplished for U-2 SIGINT 
missions today. The profile for aerial refueling, long duration orbits 
along the periphery of hostilities, resembles that of the SIGINT 
collection mission but adds the complexity of manned (receiver) 
and unmanned (refueler) interaction. Unmanned airlift hinges on 
overcoming a psychological and a policy barrier, the former being 
that of passengers willing to fly on a plane with no aircrew and the 
latter on foreign countries allowing access to their airports by 
robotic aircraft. An interim step to unmanned airlift could be 
manned aircraft that have the option of being unmanned [11].  
In the lower half of Figure 18, UAVs are employed in weapon-delivery 
roles. Progress in the weapon-delivery direction for UAVs depends on developing 
increasing levels of autonomy. 
Do increasing levels of autonomy portend a completely unmanned flying 
force? The projected direction of UAVs and technological advancements 
provides evidence of an ever-increasing UAV presence but not to the exclusion 
of unmanned aviation. Certain missions, such as ISR and communications 
support, are more likely to be manned than others, such as air interdiction and 
close air support—which will soon be completely unmanned [55]. The evidence 
favors an integrated manned- and unmanned force at least through 2030, as 
forecasted in DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030. Technological advances could 
permit a completely unmanned flying force. On the other hand, a mindset in 
support of autonomous warfighting may not be present.  
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1. Goals for UAVs 
According to [11], the following goals are consistent with current strategic 
planning guidance (SPG) and are intended to promote transformational, 
interoperable, cost-effective, unmanned aircraft across the U.S. services. 
• Develop and operationally assess fielding of a joint, 
unmanned, combat-aircraft system capable of performing 
SEAD/strike/electronic attack/ISR in high-threat 
environments. (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 
United States Air Force [USAF], United States Navy [USN])  
• Field secure common-data-link (CDL) communications for 
aircraft-control and sensor-product data distribution for all 
tactical and larger UAVs, with improved capability to prevent 
interception, interference, jamming, and hijacking. (OSD, 
United States Army [USA], USAF, USN, United States 
Marine Corps [USMC])  
• Ensure compliance with the existing National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) metadata standard for all full-
motion-video-capable UAVs. Operationally demonstrate and 
field near-real time (less than three minute) UAV metadata-
derived targeting capability for coordinate seeking weapons. 
(OSD, USAF, USA, USN, USMC)  
• Foster the development of policies, standards, and 
procedures that enable safe, timely, routine access by UAVs 
to controlled and uncontrolled airspace, to include: 
•  
o promoting the development, adoption, and 
enforcement of industry-wide airworthiness standards 
for the design, manufacturing, testing, and 
employment of UAVs (OSD)  
o coordinating with Federal Aviation Administration 
procedures for operating DoD UAVs in unrestricted 
airspace like manned counterparts (i.e., aircraft, light-
sport aircraft, and radio-controlled model aircraft) 
(OSD)  
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o developing and fielding the capability for UAVs to 
“see” and autonomously avoid other aircraft, providing 
a level of safety similar to that of comparable manned 
systems (USAF, USA, USN, USMC)  
•  
• Improve combatant commander UAV effectiveness through 
improved joint service collaboration. (OSD, Joint Forces 
Command [JFCOM], USAF, USA, USN, USMC)  
• Develop and field reliable propulsion alternatives to gasoline-
powered, internal-combustion engines on UAVs, specifically 
their replacement with heavy-fuel engines. (OSD, USAF, 
USA, USN, USMC)  
• Improve adverse-weather UAV capabilities to provide higher 
mission availability and -effectiveness rates. (OSD, USAF, 
USA, USN, USMC)  
• Ensure standardized and protected positive control of 
weapons carried on UAVs. Develop a standard UAV 
architecture including weapons interface for all appropriate 
UAVs. (OSD, USAF, USA, USN, USMC)  
• Support rapid integration of validated combat capability in 
fielded and deployed systems through a more flexible test- 
and logistical-support process. (OSD, JFCOM, USAF, USA, 
USN, USMC) [11]. 
DoD is taking a much broader view of the entire unmanned systems 
landscape and opportunities for military transformation. Clearly, this is a multiple 
technology- and human-capability realm that delivers priceless information to 
battle commanders, remains operative for long durations, and saves pilots’ lives. 
Several overarching concepts are outlined in [11] as: 
• Integration within unmanned systems (and with manned 
systems) will be high, necessitating a greater degree of 
interoperability from the outset, not added later as an 
afterthought.  
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• The trade space between capability and cost will become 
much greater, offering a wider range of options but 
producing much more complex and integrated systems, 
challenging the current “platform” focus on weapons 
acquisition  
• Unmanned systems may be grouped more by technology, 
and less by traditional classifications; e.g. small UAVs may 
have more in common with unmanned, ground vehicles 
(UGVs) than with larger UAVs [11]. 
Because the ultimate goal is to integrate human and unmanned systems 
into the battlespace seamlessly, the common UAV interface under development 
should include suitability to other unmanned platforms. 
The overall interoperability of unmanned platforms will be supported by 
broad efforts to establish and expand standardization and interoperability. 
Communication standards established by the global information grid will provide 
infrastructure and its components to support net-centric information sharing 
among platforms. Joint command-and-control interfaces will provide standard 
message sets and procedures for exchange of situational awareness and tasking 
among unmanned platforms [11]. Specific data standards for applications such 
as ISR will further support information exchange across systems. 
D. CURRENT PROJECTS  
J-UCAS, the leading UAV project of DARPA, is a joint DARPA/Air 
Force/Navy effort to demonstrate the technical feasibility, military utility, and 
operational value of a networked system of high-performance, weaponized, 
unmanned, aerial vehicles to effectively and affordably prosecute 21st century 
combat missions, including SEAD, surveillance, and precision striking within the 
emerging global command-and-control architecture [56]. The J-UCAS project’s 
primary goal is to provide all services of the military with a system that has 
worldwide combat capability. More robust hardware and software solutions and 
advanced communications capabilities are required for this project. 
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1. Aircraft 
Two aircraft are being developed under the J-UCAS program: the X-45 (by 
Boeing), and the X-47 (by Northrop Grumman). They are now being tested and 
improved. Both are flying prototypes.  
a. Boeing X-45 
The Boeing X-45 project was initially intended as a platform for 
software testing, but it became a fully autonomous, weaponized, SEAD platform. 
Its first flight was on May 22, 2002 [39]. 
In April 2004, the X-45 dropped GPS-guided bombs autonomously. 
By permission of a human operator, the aircraft released its bombs after 
autonomously navigating to a predefined target [39]. This first weapon release 
from a UAV was a big step in development. 
 In August 2004, the program demonstrated another huge gain in 
the form of multi-vehicle capabilities. Two aircraft taking off separately met, flew 
in formation, and followed a virtual lead aircraft. They maintained precise position 
by sharing information over a data link. One of the most impressive aspects is 
that this feat was overseen by a single human operator monitoring aircraft 
status—a good demonstration of the X-45’s autonomous capability. The system 
will eventually fly with four aircraft under one operator’s control. Boeing plans to 
have the X-45C ready for mission by 2010 [39]. 
   
Figure 19.   The X-45C 
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b. Northrop Grumman X-47B 
 The X-47B will be a transformational, carrier-capable, and 
survivable multi-mission UCAV. With its long-range, high-endurance capabilities, 
it will perform a various missions such as ISR and time-sensitive targeting and 
strike.  
X-47 is envisioned as a ship-based force multiplier that will 
complement manned systems by building and maintaining a 
common operational picture; providing targeting for other weapons 
and weapon systems; taking lethal action against designated fixed 
or moving targets; and collecting and disseminating post-strike 
information. This aircraft will provide longer range with a 1,000 nm 
combat radius, the ability to loiter over a target for up to 2 hours, 
and the ability to carry 4,500 lbs of payload. This aircraft is also 
being designed to meet Air Force requirements, and so could prove 
to be a multi branch aircraft [39]. 
   
Figure 20.   The X-47B 
 The program will identify the critical technologies for the suitability 
of an autonomous UAV for aircraft-carrier operations. Flight testing is scheduled 
to begin in late 2009 and carrier landings in 2011; the program will conclude in 
2013 [57].  
2. Common Operating System 
The common operating system (COS) is a software platform being 
developed to meet the design requirements of the J-UCAS project and is 
intended to combine weapons, sensors, and communications for all UAV 
platforms. Every aspect of software that goes beyond a single component is 
considered part of the COS. This includes communications protocols, both within 
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the system and to external sources, interfaces between different hardware 
components (such as weapons, sensors, and aircraft), and human interfaces that 
allow on-the-fly reprogramming [39]. The COS is a key component of the J-
UCAS project with its capability to provide the autonomy, flexibility, and 
interoperability necessary for the success of the system.  
COS provides the autonomous system ”intelligence” for the overall 
J-UCAS. It enables interoperability among multiple air vehicles and 
control stations, facilitating the integration of other system 
components such as sensors, weapons, and communications. It 
encompasses the software architecture, algorithms, applications 
and services that provide command and control, communications 
management, mission planning, much of the interactive autonomy, 
the human systems interface and the many other qualities 
associated with the J-UCAS system [56]. 
The idea is to develop a control mechanism that can handle the rapidly 
changing capabilities of different UAV platforms without requiring redesigned. 
Thus, the COS will be platform independent and able to work with both present 
and future systems. 
As a result of promising advances, UAVs are now considered highly 
effective assets in various types of missions. It will not be long before the armed 
services have truly combat-capable UAVs in addition to their successful ISR 
aircraft [39]. DoD UAV Roadmap 2002 predicts that “twenty-five years from now 
(2027), UAVs may exist with morphing airframes, able to optimize their shape for 
various missions and flight conditions with stretching skins and shape memory 
alloys permitting aerodynamic maneuvers impossible for manned aircraft.” This 
may seem fanciful; but fully autonomous combat aircraft seemed fanciful twenty-




VI. TURKISH ARMED FORCES UTILITIES 
Review of UAV missions in Chapters III and IV, shows successful 
completion of a variety of operations and great military utility; and of course, 
UAVs have flown many successful missions since Operation Desert Storm. But 
the use of unmanned, aerial vehicles as tactical weapons and military force 
multipliers is a new concept to the Turkish armed forces.  
Turkey’s initial UAV studies began in the 1990s, when Savunma Sanayii 
Mustesarligi-SSM, working in the undersecretariat for defense industries, was 
charged to define the development, production, and defense-systems 
procurement needs of the Turkish armed forces and national-defense industrial 
infrastructure. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey invested in critical UAV 
technologies such as airframe design, communication-subsystem design, and 
system integration, via several manned aircraft codevelopment and joint-venture 
programs [58]. 
UAV capabilities and missions have been predominantly viewed as 
supplemental to manned aircraft and space-based platforms. What has been 
demonstrated in conflict, however, is the UAV’s excellence in asymmetric 
environments, including unique-target identification and strike capability. 
Doubtless, military-decision makers will remain more comfortable with the proven 
abilities and performance of manned aircraft for some time. With many high-level 
personnel being former pilots, the decision “manned vs. unmanned” may still be 
very difficult [27]. This study merely points to the powerful array of UAV 
accomplishments and, for the consideration of planners and decision makers, 
cites their potential ability to transform military platforms. 
Advances in technology and systems under integration into UAV platforms 
include electro-optical imaging, synthetic-aperture radar, increasingly capable 
microprocessors, sensors, jammers, increased data-link rates, radar-absorbing 
materials, the use of high-bandwidth communications, and SATCOM-equipped 
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navigation systems, making UAVs a formidable asset to all combatants, including 
the Turkish armed forces. UAVs’ altitudinal diversity and relatively slow speed 
make them difficult to detect or recognize. Operating restrictions are typically not 
as limiting for UAVs. Additionally, UAV missions, typically carried out over enemy 
territory and against sophisticated, integrated, air-defense systems, eliminate the 
pre-eminent mission constraint: risk to life and to hugely expensive aircraft. For 
combatant commanders, accomplishing mission objectives without friendly-force 
loss is becoming paramount as societies increasingly expect modern warfare to 
be conducted with little to no collateral damage and death [27]. 
Because UAVs perform missions that are considerably more efficient and 
economical than manned aircraft, innovative uses will continue to arise. Besides 
tactical and strategic military functions, UAVs could provide greater flexibility in 
Turkish border and coastal-patrol missions. 
A. TURKEY’S UAV BACKGROUND 
TAI (Turkish Aerospace Industries) developed the first Turkish UAV 
platform in the early 1990s, named UAV X1, and successfuly executed wheeled 
launch and recovery with an endurance of approximately one hour. To better 
define the requirements of the Turkish armed forces, SSM procured an off-the-
shelf system, the Gnat-750. Gnat-750, later upgraded as I-Gnat, was put into 
operational use in the mid-1990s and Turkish armed forces accumulated 
extensive experience from the operation of a UAV system [58].  
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey continued to invest in critical UAV 
technologies like airframe design, communication-subsystem design, and system 
integration, via several manned-aircraft codevelopments and joint ventures.  
By the end of the 1990s, Turkey had categorized UAV requirements as 




SSM stategy was to launch national development programs for each category 
and for immediate needs, to make off-the-shelf procurements with local content 
by Turkish industry [58].  
Turkish industrial capacities for UAV systems provided by major local 
companies include unmanned, air-vehicle design and manufacture, command- 
and-control subsystems, data linkage, payloads, image interpretation and 
exploitation, and engines.  
Turkish Aerospace Industries is the main design and manufacturing 
source for UAVs, including design and manufacturing of drone systems, which 
are converted into reconnaissance systems by integrating a day-TV payload. 
MALE category UAV design has completed its initial phase and is proceeding to 
final design; the system-level integration of the UAV system has also been 
accomplished by TAI. The Kalekalıp/Baykar and Vestel Savunma companies 
design and manufacturing mini UAVs. Their tactical UAV design is started and 
mini-UAV projects are underway for SSM acceptance [58]. 
STM, Ayesas, and Milsoft are companies responsible for command- and-
control subsystems and software capabilities. SAVRONIK company is the 
designated subcontractor for UAV command and control and video-data linkage. 
Savronik company is developing Ku-band, spread-spectrum data links to be 
utilized for EO/IR and synthetic-aparture-radar data downlink. ASELSAN 
company is the designated subcontractor for EO/IR laser designation (LD) and 
laser rangefinder (LRF) payload. ASELSAN and SDT companies are jointly 
developing a synthetic-aparture radar, and are in the design phase. Milsoft is 
responsible for an image-interpretation and explotation station, now in the 
development phase, and will be able to provide intelligence information from 
EO/IR video images, SAR/ISAR, and satellite images. Tusas Engine Industries 
(TEI), in the UAV field, is currenty working on turboprob engine development for 
the MALE+ category of UAV. [58] 
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B. TURKEY’S UAV PROGRAMS 
It is deemed vital for the Turkish armed forces (TAF) that indigenous 
technologies play a major role in UAV employment. Adaptable, flexible, and 
accurate UAV platforms are the basis for interoperability in a linked environment 
built for superior situational awareness. Following TAF need, Turkey’s UAV 
program strategy consists of; 
• mini UAV development and production 
• tactical UAV development 
• MALE UAV development 
• MALE UAV procurement 
Kalekalıp/Baykar company contracted for the mini-UAV program in 
October 2006. Required performance characteristics for the mini UAV, as 
specified in [58], are: 
• one-hour endurance 
• hand launchability 
• parachute recoverability 
• day- and night-vision capability 
• pre- and inflight programability 
• full autonomy 
National development on tactical UAVs started in fall, 2007, with 
Kalekalıp/Baykar and Vestel Savunma companies developing systems under 
competition. The targeted performance characteristics derived from [58] for the 
tactical UAV are; 
• six-or-more-hour endurance 
• sixteen Kft.+ 
• catapult launchability 
• parachute recoverability 
• day and night-vision capability 
• pre- and inflight programability 
  103
• full autonomy 
MALE UAV development was launched in December 2004. Initial flight is 
expected in 2010 and prototype completion is targeted for 2011. In accordance 
with UAV-program strategies and in parallel with the national MALE development 
program, an off-the-shelf system procurement has been performed. An IAI-made 
Heron UAV system in the MALE category will soon be in inventory, filling the 
operational-needs gap until the nationally developed UAV system enters 
inventory [58]. 
In 2004, Turkey attempted to acquire ten off-the-shelf, medium-altitude, 
long-endurance UAVs and equipment, to be distributed between the three major 
military services. The U.S. company General Atomics offered the Predator UAV, 
while the Israelis, bidding as the Israeli UAV Partnership (IUP), offered the 
Heron. In April 2005, Turkey had chosen to accept the Israeli Heron UAV. 
Turkey's defense-industries undersecretariat (SSM) and Turkish Aerospace 
Industries signed a contract in May 2005 with IUP, a partnership of Israel Aircraft 
Industries and Elbit Systems, that called for thirty percent of the project to include 
Turkish subsystems and services. Ten UAVs with associated surveillance and 
ground command-and-control systems will be delivered to the TAF in from two to 
three years. It was also stated that the Turkish air force will get four UAVs, with 
four going to the army and two to the navy [59].  
At the same time, TAI has decided on the development of six indigenous 
UAV systems under a sixty-five million USD contract concluded with the SSM. 
The first of these is deliverable to the TAF in 2009–10. In the second phase of 
the project, Turkey had planned to acquire forty-six Harpy II drones from Israeli 
Aircraft Industries (IAI) for suppression of enemy air defenses. This would allow 
standardization with the 108 Harpy drones already in TAF inventory, ordered in 
1999 and delivered in 2002. However, in early 2006, Turkey decided not to 
proceed with the purchase of additional Harpy UAVs [59]. 
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Emerging needs, technological advances, and UAV successes in conflict 
are starting to change the perceived value of UAVs in the TAF, and Turkey’s 
investments and projects in current UAV programs are steadily progressing. It is 
considered strategically important for Turkey to maintain the know-how and 
experience gained from the UAV program and projects and to integrate all 
applicable subsystems. The indigenous-development programs and 
procurements are analyzed in the following section.  
1. Baykus 
As a result of the advanced technologies and activities regarding 
unmanned vehicles—which are of great importance in the aviation sector—and 
taking into consideration the requirements for tactical, unmanned, aerial vehicles, 
TAI designed and developed an ISR UAV called Baykus. The ground tests of 
Baykus were successfully completed [60].  
    
Figure 21.   The Baykus 
2. Marti 
The Marti aircraft used for pilot training has been in service since 2003. As 
a very stable platform, it is also used in the aerial, digital, photographic-image 
gathering and numerical image analysis carried out with TUBITAK (the Scientific 
and Technical Research Council of Turkey). The shots taken by Marti in Mersin 
in 2004 were found more successful than the old balloon method [60].  
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Figure 22.   The Marti 
3. Pelikan 
Pelikan was designed and developed by TAI within the framework of 
continuous activities regarding unmanned vehicles and taking into consideration 
the requirements for the tactical, unmanned, aerial vehicles for the TAF. Pelikan 
is the half-scale, training version of Baykus. Flight tests of Pelikan are ongoing 
[60]. 
   
Figure 23.   The Pelikan 
4. Gozcu 
The Gozcu close-range (CR) tactical UAV is an indigenous TAI design 
and development, intended to meet short- and long-term tactical-UAV 
requirements; flight tests were successfully completed. The system comprises 
the air vehicle, ground-control station, catapult launcher and ground generators, 
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and can easily be used on any runway with catapult takeoff and parachute 
recovery. All hardware and software in the system, which features waypoint 
navigation and autonomous flight, were developed by TAI engineers [60]. 
Technical Specifications: 
Basic performance specifications of the Gozcu system derived from [59] 
are as follows: 
Service ceiling: 3,050 m (10,000 ft) 
Endurance: >2 h 
Cruising speed: approximately 100 kt (185 km/h; 115 mph) 
Mission (data link) radius: 27 n miles (50 km; 31 miles) 
Maximum payload: approximately 8 kg (17.6 lb) 
Maximum launching weight: 85 kg (187 lb) 
Power plant: One 28.3 kW (38 hp) piston engine; two-blade pusher 
propeller  
Wingspan: 3.75 m (12 ft 3.6 in) 
Length overall: 2.45 m (8 ft 0.5 in) 
Height overall: 0.66 m (2 ft 2.0 in)  
 
   
Figure 24.   The Gozcu 
5. Bayraktar 
The Bayraktar mini-UAV system is designed for aerial reconnaissance and 
surveillance for the Turkish army. The V-tail form, aerodynamically stable, fixed-
  107
wing platform is manufactured with materials such as carbon fiber, Kevlar, glass 
fiber and computer numerical control (CNC)-machined aluminum parts. The mini 
UAV system can be hand launched and land on its body. The power system is 
composed of two electric motors. Rapid system setup and deployment satisfies 
mobility needs for both military and commercial applications requiring aerial 
surveillance and reconnaissance. The system’s advanced avionics with 
embedded, real-time software handle stabilization, waypoint navigation, digital 
communication, and digital-image transferring modes. The autopilot supports 
autonomous flight, takeoff and landing, and half-automatic control through 
joystick and manual controls with a secure, digitally encrypted link [61].  
The ground-control system (GCS) provides a link between the operator 
interface, running on a ruggedized, Windows-based PC system, and the UAV. 
The system supports real-time command, control, and monitoring of the UAV in 
flight. In addition, the flight can be visualized in a 3D-environment such as 
Microsoft Flight Simulator. The software architecture of the Bayraktar’s electronic 
systems is based on multi-UAV systems applications and on the development 
phase [61]. 
Technical Specifications: 
Basic performance specification for the Bayraktar system derived from 
[62] is as follows: 
Service ceiling: 2,000 ft 
Endurance: 1 h 
Cruising Speed: 15.4 m/s 
Mission (data link) radius: 15 km 
Maximum launching weight: 4.5 kg 
Wingspan: 1.6 m  
Length overall: 1.2 m  
  108
   
Figure 25.   The Bayraktar 
6. MEDIUM ALTITUDE, LONG ENDURANCE UAV (TIHA) 
The contract regarding the development of a medium altitude, long 
endurance (MALE) unmanned, aerial vehicle (UAV) system for the 
reconnaissance requirements of the TAF became effective on 24 
December 2004. Within the framework of the program, a total of 
three prototypes and ground systems are planned to be designed, 
developed, manufactured and flight-tested by the end of 2010 [60].  
The Turkish indigenous MALE UAV (TIHA) system components derived 
from [60] will be: 
• Air vehicles (A/V) 
• A ground-control Station (GCS) 
• A ground data terminal (GDT) 
• An automatic takeoff and landing system (ATOLS) 
• A transportable image-exploitation system (TIES) 
• A remote-video terminal (RVT) 
• Ground-support equipment (GSE). 
The indigenous TIHA system is designed to support night and day 
missions in adverse weather. The system performs real-time image intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, target detection, recognition, identification, and 
tracking, and has the potential to carry weapons [60]. 
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According to [59], the TIHA UAV is configured to carry the following 
payloads onboard, with an open architecture to support numerous potential 
missions: 
• Electro-optical, color, day camera (ASELFLIR-300T EO)  
• Electro-optical, infrared, laser camera (EO/IR/LRF/LD/Spotter) 
(ASELFLIR-300T)  
• SAR/GMTI, ISAR payload 
The whole composite airframe is composed of a monoblock 
fuselage, detachable wing and V-Tail, retractable landing gear, 
redundant control surfaces, avionics and payload bays and service 
doors. The sandwich skin structure is reinforced by composite or 
metallic frames, ribs and supports. Propelled by a pusher type 
heavy fuel engine, the aircraft is furnished with fuselage fuel tanks 
and fuel system, ice protection system, environmental control 
system, lighting system, redundant electrical system with battery 
backup and harness system [60]. 
The platform is also equipped with a digital flight-control system, 
electromechanical actuators, and flight-control sensor systems 
such as: pitot-static air-data computer, navigation sensor, 
transducers, temperature, pressure, displacement sensors, etc. 
Various tasks are distributed along flight management computers 
and auxiliary control boxes. Identification and communication units 
and interface computers are employed in order to establish real-
time, wideband communication and provide test and diagnostics 
functions. An air-traffic radio is also integrated in the 
communication system for integration of the aircraft into the civilian 
airspace. All flight critical equipments are dual or triple redundant 
and emergency modes of operational scenarios are taken into 
consideration for fail-safe design [60]. 
The system-level integration of the UAV and flight-software configurations 
embedded on both air and ground equipment are being developed indigenously 
by TAI. In a similar manner, all required mission hardware and software are 
slated for indigenous development by national subcontractors [58]. 
The TIHA GCS has the capability to manage, monitor, and control the 
whole-mission segments of the air vehicle, including payloads. The mission plan 
can be programmed and loaded before flight or altered during flight. Operators 
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can display and record all the payloads’ imagery stream in real time. An 
automatic takeoff and landing terminal allows the UAV to operate without 
operator intervention. The system can analyze and sort out valuable intelligence 
information and distribute real-time imagery data to other nodes in the battlefield. 
Upper-level commanders can monitor the network of TIHA systems and benefit 
from the gathered intelligence information. [60]. 
Technical Specifications: 
The basic performance specification of the TIHA system derived from [59] 
is as follows: 
Service ceiling: 9,140 m (30,000 ft) 
Endurance: 24 h 
Cruising speed: >75 kt (139 km/h; 86 mph) 
Mission (data link) radius: 108 n miles (200 km; 124 miles) 
Maximum fuel weight: 250 kg (551 lb) 
Maximum payload: 200 kg (441 lb) 
Maximum launching weight: 1,500 kg (3,306 lb) 
Power plant: One (unspecified) piston engine driving a pusher propeller. 
Fuel tank in center fuselage  
Wingspan: 17,313 m (56 ft 9.6 in) 
Length overall: 10.00 m (32 ft 9.7 in) 
   
Figure 26.   The MALE UAV (TIHA) 
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7. Harpy 
Harpy is a lethal UAV used to detect, attack, and destroy radar emitters. 
Harpy is designed as a fire-and-forget, all-weather, day or night, autonomous 
weapon system, launched from a ground vehicle or ship. Harpy suppresses 
hostile SAM and radar sites for long durations by detecting signals with an 
onboard passive radar receiver, attacking and destroying radar targets with high 
accuracy. Harpy provides the most effective solution to the hostile-radar problem, 
at the lowest price [63].  
Harpy is sealed in its launcher to endure battlefield conditions and can be 
fueled in the launcher to retain readiness at all times. The Harpy system is air 
transportable by a C-130-class aircraft. The system uses periodical built-in 
testing to maintain full readiness. In 1999, the TAF took delivery of Harpy lethal 
UAVs from IAI. Reports suggest that more than a hundred were delivered [59].  
Technical Specifications: 
The basic performance specification of the Harpy system derived from [59] 
is as follows: 
Maximum level speed: 250 km/h 
Ceiling: 3,000 m (9,840 ft) 
Mission radius: 400-500 km 
Endurance: 2 h (400 km mission radius) 
Overall height: 0.36 m  
Wingspan: 2.00 m  
Overall length: 2.30 m  
Weight: 32 kg (warhead); 120-135 kg (UAV)  
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Figure 27.   The Harpy 
8. Heron 
The Heron UAV was developed by IAI / Malat as an operational long-
endurance, medium-altitude system with fully automatic takeoff and landing. 
Heron can perform real-time missions including deep penetration, wide-area 
intelligence collection, surveillance, target acquisition, target tracking, elint, 
comint, and communications/data relay. All missions can be planned before 
takeoff; flight is automatic, with the ability to transmit changes in real time and to 
introduce route changes during flight. The GCS is a derivative of the GCS-3000 
developed for the Hunter UAV and consists of two operator consoles and one 
command/control console. The GCS allows for all mission planning, control, 
command, and processing functions to operate the UAV and payloads. The 
Heron UAV system initially deployed with the Indian defense forces for high-
altitude land surveillance and maritime patrol. The Heron has been acquired by 
the Israeli air force and Turkish defense forces for strategic reconnaissance and 
surveillance [59].  
According to [63], the Heron’s main features and payload capabilities are: 
• Multiple operational configurations  
• Adverse weather capability  
• Safe, reliable, and easy operation  
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• Simultaneous, four-sensor capability  
• Satellite communication for extended range (SATCOM)  
• Two proven, simultaneous, automatic-takeoff-and-landing (ATOL) 
systems for maximal safety  
• Fully redundant, state-of-the-art avionics  
• Retractable landing gear  
• Payloads 
• Electro optical (TV & IR combi or triple sensor TV/IR/LD)  
• Synthetic-aperture radar (SAR)  
• Maritime-patrol radar (MPR)  
• COMINT and ESM capability  
• Customer-furnished sensor suites  
• Communication-relay package  
• Integrated ATC radio  
Technical Specifications: 
The basic performance specification of the Heron system derived from 
[59] is as follows: 
Service Ceiling: 8,075 m (26,500 ft) 
Endurance: 45 h 
Cruising Speed: 125 kt (231 km/h; 144 mph) 
Mission radius: LOS Data link - 108 n miles (200 km; 124 miles) 
Mission radius: BLOS Data link - 189 n miles (350 km; 217 miles)  
Maximum fuel weight: 430 kg (948 lb) 
Maximum payload: 250 kg (551 lb) 
Maximum launching weight: 1,150 kg  
Power plant: One 73.5 kW (98.6 hp) turbocharged Rotax 914 F four-
cylinder, four-stroke engine; two-blade, variable-pitch, pusher propeller. Wet-wing 
integral fuel tank plus fuselage tank; combined capacity 720 liters (190 U.S. 
gallons) 
Wingspan: 16.60 m (54 ft 5.5 in) 
Length overall: 8.50 m (27 ft 10.6 in) 
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Figure 28.   The Heron 
9. Keklik-Tracking Target Drone 
The Keklik system, designed for use in non-firing tracking training with 
radar and optical guided missiles or barreled antiaircraft guns, is a low-cost 
training target. The system consists of an aircraft, launcher, ground-control 
system, and ground-support equipment. The aircraft has a low delta wing and 
composite structure with tractor-type power plant and is launched manually by 
bungee catapult. The aircraft does not need a runway for takeoff and landing and 
recovers by a remotely controlled parachute on land or sea. Its compact structure 
and light weight provide ease of takeoff, flight, and recovery and convenience 
and flexibility in transportation, deployment, and operations. The system has 
short assembly and transportation periods and can be operated by two crews 
from any terrain [60].  
The Keklik is an indigenous, cost-effective, and practical training option 
due to its fifteen minutes turnaround time, including fuel supply, preflight checks, 
and maintenance. The aircraft can reach high speeds while sustaining long 
endurance because of low aerodynamic drag. The system is composed of COTS 
items, based on modularity and simple architecture [60].  
Technical Specifications: 
The basic performance specification of the Keklik-Tracking Target Drone 
derived from [59] is as follows: 
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Endurance: 30 min 
Maximum LOS control radius: 1,500 m (4,920 ft) 
Cruising speed: 81 kt (150 km/h; 93 mph) 
Stalling speed: 27 kt (50 km/h; 31 mph) 
Weight empty: 7.0 kg (15.4 lb) 
Maximum launching weight: 10.0 kg (22.0 lb) 
Power plant: one 2.1 kW (2.8 hp) OS-MAX 91 Fx single-cylinder piston 
engine; two-blade propeller 
Wingspan: 1.61 m (5 ft 3.4 in) 
Length overall: 1.36 m (4 ft 5.5 in) 
Height overall: 0.32 m (1 ft 0.6 in)  
 
 
Figure 29.   The Keklik 
10. Turna Target-Drone System 
The Turna target-drone system was designed and produced indigenously 
by TAI for TAF air-defense training. The system is used for exercises in tracking 
and firing radar; optically, thermally, or manually controlled, barreled antiaircraft 
guns; and guided missiles, such as Rapier and Stinger. The system can also be 
used for tactical ISR and target detection when equipped with a high-resolution 
digital camera, EO or IR camera, video downlink, and laser rangefinder [59]. 
Turna target-drone systems entered the inventory of TAF in 2001 for the 
high-speed and low-cost air-defense units’ training needs. The system can 
simulate all aerial threat elements, ranging from aircraft to missiles with high 
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maneuverability, and measure their firing performance. Turna is an automated, 
transportable, and modular system with GCS including takeoff and landing. It 
takes off with a bungee catapult launcher and recovers by parachute. The 
system can take off from Knox-class battleships and skid-land in emergencies. 
The avionics and ground-control system are GPS supported and data is coded 
during transmission and receiving. Operators can monitor and control multiple 
aircraft, digital moving maps, imagery displays, and records. In a datalink failure, 
Turns aircraft can execute a predefined emergency flight procedure, loiter till the 
link is reestablished, or return home. The system transfers all real-time flight data 
to operators by line-of-sight data-link equipment. The Turna can handle payloads 
such as IR thermal-heat source detector, smoke, photographic camera, video 
camera, and passive radar cross-section generators [60]. 
Since the Keklik system uses the common command infrastructure 
with “Turna,” both aircraft can be operated with the same command 
equipment, and Keklik is also utilized for transition flights of Turna. 
[60].  
Technical Specifications: 
The basic performance specification of the Turna target drone, derived 
from [59], is as follows: 
Endurance: 1 h 30 min  
Ceiling: 3,000 m (9,840 ft) 
Maximum LOS control radius: 0.8 n miles (1.5 km; 0.9 miles) 
GCS: 8.1 n miles (15 km; 9.3 miles) 
Cruising speed: 59 kt (110 km/h; 68 mph) 
Maximum cruise speed: 216 kt (400 km/h; 248 mph) 
Weight empty: 45 kg (99.2 lb) 
Maximum launching weight: 75 kg (165 lb) 
Maximum payload: 15.0 kg (33.1 lb) 
Power plant: one 28.3 kW (38 hp) UEL AR 741 rotary engine; two-blade 
wooden, fixed-pitch, pusher propeller. Fuel capacity: 14 liters (3.7 U.S. gallons; 
3.1 Imp gallons) 
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Wingspan: 2.67 m (8 ft 9.1 in) 
Length overall: 2.66 m (8 ft 8.7 in) 
Height overall: 0.57 m (1 ft 10.4 in)  
 
   
Figure 30.   The Turna 
Turkey has a wide range of UAV operational requirements in mini, tactical, 
and MALE categories. Turkish industry has gathered experience on UAV system 
integration, subsystem design, manufacturing, and expending its capabilities with 
a wide range of indigenous-development programs. It is important for Turkey to 
become a developer of indigenous UAV systems to meet all the requirements of 
the TAF.  
The course of improvement in the analyzed programs and projects will 
determine whether UAVs replace or supplement current manned systems in TAF 
inventory; because UAVs will make a significant contribution only to the extent 














VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis explored past, current, and possible future operating 
environments involving the use of several unmanned, aerial vehicles (UAVs) to 
better understand the changing dynamics of combat-aviation tactics. Also 
examined were major UAV platforms in terms of various roles and capabilities, 
including UAV utilities, limitations, and performance metrics. Technological 
advancements and political and economical considerations leading to the use of 
UAVs in four recent conflicts were discussed to illuminate the evolution of UAVs. 
This study examined the potential of UAVs as sensors in a network-centric 
environment, particularly in a rapidly changing battlespace.  
The argument as to whether UAVs or their manned counterparts are more 
effective in projecting combat power has attracted increasing interest. While 
manned aircraft have clearly been effective since WWI, UAVs are emerging as a 
viable way to reduce pilot risk while maintaining air dominance. Increased usage 
is rising alongside increasing demands for battlefield intelligence, tighter defense 
budgets, faster operations tempos, and lowered tolerance for casualties. UAV 
advantages over manned platforms keep multiplying and they include critical 
considerations such as reduced cost and personnel risk, higher payoff in 
intelligence returns, greater flexibility in mission profiling and tasking, better 
performance in hostile environments, and ability to undertake dull, dirty, and 
dangerous, and protracted missions. Lessons from previous conflicts created a 
misconception that manned platforms are obsolete, thereby increasing UAV 
employment over increasingly diverse platforms. To the extent that generating a 
common operational picture based on near-real-time data culminating in maximal 
battlespace awareness remains a paramount aim in modern warfare, UAVs may 
be poised to dominate over their manned counterparts simply because they are 
self-contained units that satisfy that objective exceedingly well. With 
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technological advancements and growth in capabilities, UAVs are becoming 
indispensable to commanders in lifting or reducing the fog of war. All serious 
military powers are advised to heed the emerging roles of the multiple types of 
UAVs as they do practically everything required of a military asset except 
exposing a pilot to harm. 
1. U.S. UAV Utilization Issues: 
Lessons about UAV utilization derived from four U.S. conflicts are helpful 
in guiding corrective actions for the issues that TAF faces or will face, and 
problems encountered by the U.S. in their development and fielding of UAVs are 
important to the TAF’s UAV applications and programs. Below is a summary of 
[11] UAV utilization issues concerning GWOT: 
• The low-density/high-demand nature of the limited UAV 
force and the operational demands placed on it created a 
conflict in priorities between employing UAVs in its two key 
roles, sensing and shooting. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Predators were tasked to find targets, designate them for 
manned strike, and strike them themselves. Both the limited 
number of weapons carried and the coordination time 
required to obtain permission to employ them subtracted 
from UAV availability to pursue mobile targets, a key 
concern of intelligence staffs.  
• Weather, in particular high winds, posed a major constraint 
on UAV operations due to their lighter weights and higher-
aspect-ratio wings compared to manned aircraft. Winds up to 
seventy knots in the theater significantly reduced the 
availability of most UAVs, and accompanying dust storms 
degraded their ability to use EO sensors; however, Global 
Hawk, carrying an EO/IR/SAR combined sensor, was still 
able to perform effectively during dust storms.  
• Despite the capability of operating multiple UAVs per system 
simultaneously, the limited number of frequencies available 
often restricted the number to one UAV airborne at a time.  
• Integration of unmanned aviation into the national airspace 
system is needed to enable file-and-fly operations by UAVs 
to improve their responsiveness and fidelity of training.  
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• The dynamic nature of the joint operational environment for 
which UAVs are employed in Afghanistan and Iraq indicates 
a need for centralized command and control to ensure 
functional integration (intel, ops, and communications) that 
prioritizes UAV sensing-operations support.  
• A comprehensive and integrated dissemination architecture 
is needed to optimize bandwidth usage and maximize 
requirement satisfaction.  
• A net-centric approach to UAV integration and 
interoperability is needed to provide situational awareness at 
all command echelons. Consistent with the DoD’s net-centric 
data strategy, there should be additional capability for 
archiving and discovery of full motion video collected by 
UAV. UAV positional and sensor pointing information enable 
enhanced airspace and sensor management.  
• Frequency interference (loss of UAV link) was more often 
from friendly than hostile sources.  
• Urban combat is hostile to high-bandwidth, wireless, data 
communications and can result in loss of connectivity even 
at short distances. This effect is compounded by short LOS 
distances, making visual reconnaissance difficult. Urban 
combat terrain is also rapidly changing, and pre-conflict 
battlespace awareness can become useless unless 
continually refreshed [11]. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first two chapters of this thesis supported a “reasonable” comparison 
of manned vs. unmanned systems. With the exception of reliability (and UAV 
reliability is rapidly improving), analysis indicates that UAVs compare favorably in 
mission-support areas to conventional, manned aircrafts. Further, when 
considering the inherent advantages in employing unmanned systems, the TAF 
are encouraged to increase emphasis towards the use of UAVs.  
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We have considered a wide range in mission scenarios and included a 
wide variety of unmanned systems. Based on our evaluations and our 
apprehension of current Turkish UAV military technology, we recommend: 
• TAF increase political and military exposure to emerging UAV 
capabilities, including communicating the strategic, operational, and 
tactical significance of UAV funding and prioritization within the 
resource framework of TAF decision makers. 
• TAF increase efforts to aggressively develop, acquire, test, and 
field UAVs in training and operational environments. To attack this 
goal will require evaluating procurement needs according to system 
requirements and system size and complexity, e.g., development 
costs of some unmanned systems are much higher than 
procurement costs.  
• TAF define the relationships between requirements (such as high-, 
medium-, or low altitude, endurance, speed and payload) and UAV 
mission tasks, including sensors and other systems related to 
operational tasks—that is, indicate the criticality of a given mission 
system to a task and the availability of the technology to support 
the need [28]. 
• TAF integrate UAV testing with joint and combined exercises to 
develop concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and 
doctrines for their utilization. TAF might reconsider current 
doctrines, procedures, and policies to conclude how UAVs could fit 
the existing structure. TAF might examine whether UAVs need to 
be designed to fit existing restrictions, or policies and procedures 
need to be adapted to the technology.  
• TAF can encourage high levels of interoperability and 
standardization between unmanned platforms employed by 
different services. Establishing communications standards and 
providing infrastructure and components to share data among 
platforms will provide standard message sets and procedures for 
exchange of SA and tasking among these platforms. 
• TAF can coordinate the services to mitigate costs, by developing 
common UAVs, GCSs, software, and payloads.  
• TAF can increase involvement of civilian institutions to develop the 
technologies critical to the success of UAVs, e.g., take advantage 
of university brainpower to help with technological challenges. 
Additional TAF recommendations with respect to the incorporation of 
UAVs as a military resource are provided in the Appendix. 
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Considering the advantages of UAV employment in today’s rapidly 
changing battlespace and considering Turkey’s geopolitical and geographical 
position, TAF is advised to embrace to the fullest extent possible the promise that 
UAVs will magnify Turkish military capability, alongside the expectation of ever-
greater achievements through the emerging technological prowess of unmanned 
vehicles.  
The way to gain a military advantage is not necessarily to be the 
first to produce a new tool or weapon. It is to figure out better than 















This appendix includes additional recommendations for the TAF 
concerning UAVs and future UAV programs: 
• Each Service can begin to identify separate areas of added value 
by using UAVs in their military operations and to consider the 
employment of UAVs in the following circumstances, which are 
included in [33]: 
• When the lethality of the airspace to be penetrated is too 
great for manned aircraft  
• When the airspace to be penetrated is too politically risky 
for manned aircraft  
• When the airspace to be penetrated is too toxic for 
human operators  
• When lower-priority missions could be performed by 
UAVs to free highly skilled airmen to handle higher-
priority tasks  
• When overall mission effectiveness could be improved 
with UAVs [33]. 
• Based on the conflicts analyzed in Chapter III, applications, 
systems and programs, and future directions analyzed in Chapter 
V, a UAV would be deemed to fulfill the following basic 
requirements outlined in [64]:  
• Perform efficient surveillance and reconnaissance 
missions for the armed forces  
• Conduct day and night operations  
• Succeed in a wide range of weather conditions  
• Fly at various altitudes  
• Operate beyond line of sight (BLOS)  
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• Operate in real-time  
• Demonstrate multi-mission capability [64]. 
• TAF can match UAV capabilities to mission needs and to interfaces 
with ongoing programs. Interfaces can be addressed by integrating 
the UAV with an infrastructure for C3I. Each mission creates its own 
C3I integration needs, including design considerations for the 
vehicle, sensors, onboard computers, and weapon components, if 
any. Crucial C3I factors include the vital need to maintain positive 
control of UAVs, including the ability of human operators to 
intervene quickly to regain an errant, autonomously controlled 
vehicle [28].  
• Interoperability with C3I architectures appears feasible as long as 
high-level planning includes UAV capabilities and performance 
constraints. The principal C3I challenge remains positive control in 
shared airspace with manned forces, and the key technology 
needed for TAF is indigenous or procured software and hardware 
to enable real-time, onboard mission replanning for the complex set 
of UAV missions that are anticipated [28]. 
• TAF can organize intelligence products derived from UAVs to be 
available through multiple sources, including direct transmission to 
field units and other services as necessary, i.e., agile distribution 
paths permit users at all levels and services to access intelligence 
information. 
• TAF can create a training syllabus satisfying FAA requirements to 
operate as a pilot would in controlled airspace. It should also satisfy 
the services’ strict requirements for engrained military flight 
discipline and at the same time be tailored to meet the unique 
training requirements of UAV operations. 
• TAF can develop a micro-UAV capability and support research and 
development into future concepts using micro- electro-mechanical 
systems (MEMS) technology (micro-UAVs cost an order of 
magnitude less than current TUAVs, including a smaller logistical 
requirement, man portability, expendability, difficult detection, and 
ease in flying) [19]. The successful development and employment 
of micro-UAVs can increase SA of small units. 
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